25 Codex 0.158 Prompts for Platform Engineering: Sandbox Diagnostics, MCP OAuth, WebSocket Auth, Approval Review, and Release Evidence

A safe prompt library for authorized Codex 0.158 platform work

This masterclass is a practical prompt library for platform teams that are planning, testing, or documenting a controlled rollout of Codex CLI 0.158 across developer workstations, trusted repositories, and approved agent infrastructure. It is not an offensive security playbook, a shortcut around approvals, or a substitute for local change management. Every prompt in this article is written for systems you own, operate, or are explicitly authorized to administer, and every prompt assumes that a human platform owner remains accountable for reviewing recommendations before any configuration, permission, credential, network, repository, or release change is made.

OpenAI’s Codex 0.158.0 release notes describe several platform-relevant changes: configurable copy-on-select and right-click paste in the fullscreen TUI, Markdown preservation when copying transcripts, support for MCP servers whose OAuth clients use pre-registered secrets through codex mcp add --oauth-client-secret, bearer-token protection for direct exec-server WebSocket connections, transparent-background controls for image generation and editing, file-backed conversation images for edits, default terminal input approval for elevated-permission commands, and fewer unnecessary repeat reviews for runtime-only grants. The same release also fixes specific sandbox, path, approval-review, Mermaid, and command-completion issues across Windows, Linux, macOS, and runtime reporting surfaces. These are product release notes, not a security certification, so the prompts below are designed to produce inventory, plans, test fixtures, review packets, and release evidence rather than claims that a deployment is secure.

The operating model for this library is deliberately conservative. Discovery begins read-only. Prompts must not ask Codex to change files, alter permissions, start network listeners, rotate secrets, approve elevated commands, or connect to external services until a human owner has reviewed the plan and confirmed that the target system, repository, project, workspace, host, MCP server, and test environment are in scope. If a prompt produces a command sequence, treat it as a draft runbook: inspect it, adapt it to your environment, run it first in a non-production canary, capture evidence, and stop if the result differs from the expected checkpoint.

All examples use placeholders for hostnames, client IDs, secrets, bearer tokens, callback URLs, local paths, repositories, logs, and workspace names. Do not paste real credentials into a prompt, terminal transcript, ticket, pull request, chat thread, release note, or generated report. If a credential must be referenced for planning, use a placeholder such as <MCP_OAUTH_CLIENT_SECRET_ENV_VAR>, <EXEC_SERVER_BEARER_TOKEN_ENV_VAR>, or <SECRET_MANAGER_REFERENCE>, and require the final operator to retrieve the value only through your approved secret manager, vault, or identity workflow. A model-generated answer must never echo a credential, infer a token from logs, or recommend storing secrets in repository configuration.

This Codex snapshot-sharing guide examines secret-redaction limits, sensitive diffs, images, paths, and link governance, offering concrete context for keeping credentials and confidential material out of platform-engineering prompts and shared evidence. The Secure Codex Chat Snapshot Sharing: Secret-Redaction Limits, Sensitive Diffs, Images, Paths, and Link Governance article is a focused companion for Secret Safe Prompts because the target directly addresses Codex secret-redaction limits and sensitive artifacts, making it substantially more relevant than the draft consumer online-safety prompt collection.

The locked contract: authorization, least privilege, approvals, and rollback

Use this article only under a locked contract: the platform team must own the systems being evaluated or possess explicit written authorization to administer them; read-only discovery must precede modification; credentials and sensitive logs must be redacted; narrow scopes and tool allowlists must be preferred over broad access; elevated or destructive actions require human approval; and every change must have a backup, Git checkpoint, rollback plan, and evidence trail. This contract applies even if Codex can technically suggest a command, identify a configuration file, or infer a likely fix from release notes.

The Codex CLI documentation describes operational commands such as /status, /permissions, /model, and /review, and it recommends Git checkpoints before and after tasks. In this masterclass, those capabilities are treated as inspection and review surfaces, not as permission to skip organizational controls. A useful prompt asks Codex to identify the current model, permissions, sandbox posture, repository state, and pending approvals; a risky prompt asks it to “fix everything” or “grant whatever access is needed.” The difference is not stylistic: the first produces evidence a human can verify, while the second invites broad authority without an auditable decision point.

The MCP documentation states that the ChatGPT desktop app, Codex CLI, and IDE extension share MCP configuration for the same Codex host, and it documents authentication patterns including bearer tokens and OAuth for Streamable HTTP. It also documents server and per-tool approval modes, enabled and disabled tool lists, and exact callback registration requirements. Codex 0.158 adds release-note support for codex mcp add --oauth-client-secret when a pre-registered OAuth client uses a client secret. This library treats MCP configuration as a privileged integration activity: callback URLs must be exact, scopes must be narrow, enabled tools must be intentional, and a platform owner must review the server’s identity, authorization model, logging behavior, and data-handling obligations before any developer depends on the connector.

The configuration reference states that user configuration lives at ~/.codex/config.toml, that project-scoped configuration is loaded only for trusted projects, and that project configuration cannot override machine-local provider, auth, or telemetry keys. The practical implication is that prompt outputs should distinguish between user-level state, project-trusted state, and machine-local controls. A prompt that recommends editing project configuration to solve an authentication or telemetry issue may be invalid if the referenced setting cannot be overridden there; a prompt that proposes a local change without identifying the trust boundary may be incomplete.

OpenAI’s approvals and security learning material emphasizes that agent work must be controlled through approvals and permissions rather than blind automation. Codex 0.158 enabling terminal input approval by default for elevated-permission commands is therefore treated here as a safety-relevant behavior to validate, not as a feature to disable for convenience. If a workflow is too noisy, the safer next step is to classify commands, narrow the task, improve the test environment, or document a justified exception—not to broadly turn off review for commands that can alter files, permissions, services, infrastructure, package state, or release artifacts.

What changed in Codex 0.158 that matters to platform engineers

For platform engineering teams, Codex 0.158 is interesting less because of any single feature and more because the release touches several operational seams at once: terminal user experience, transcript copying, MCP authentication, direct exec-server WebSocket protection, image editing inputs, elevated-command approval, sandbox compatibility, approval-review continuity, diagram rendering, and command event reporting. A rollout plan should therefore test the combination of developer workflow, authorization boundary, platform policy, and evidence capture rather than merely confirming that the version number changed.

Codex 0.158 area	OpenAI-described behavior	Platform validation focus	Conservative decision rule
Fullscreen TUI copying and paste behavior	The release adds configurable copy-on-select and right-click paste and preserves Markdown when copying transcripts.	Confirm whether copied transcripts preserve the evidence your release process needs without exposing secrets, tokens, private logs, or restricted data.	Allow transcript sharing only after redaction review and only into approved systems of record.
MCP OAuth clients with pre-registered secrets	The release notes add support for codex mcp add --oauth-client-secret.	Verify exact callback registration, client identity, scopes, enabled tools, disabled tools, storage handling, and secret retrieval through an approved mechanism.	Never paste the real client secret into prompts, examples, tickets, code review, or generated reports.
Direct exec-server WebSocket protection	The release supports bearer-token protection for direct exec-server WebSocket connections.	Confirm that token configuration, transport exposure, network boundaries, rotation process, and log redaction match local policy.	Treat bearer-token protection as effective only when configured, monitored, and tested in the actual deployment path.
Elevated terminal input approval	Terminal input approval is enabled by default for elevated-permission commands.	Test representative commands that request elevated permissions and verify that review is presented, captured, and not bypassed by automation.	Do not disable approvals to reduce friction; redesign the workflow or require explicit platform-owner approval.
Runtime-only grants	The release notes say runtime-only grants should no longer trigger unnecessary repeat reviews.	Confirm that expected repeat prompts are reduced without broadening permissions or weakening auditability.	If a reduced review pattern is ambiguous, default to manual verification and document the observed behavior.
Windows, Linux, and macOS sandbox fixes	The release fixes Windows sandbox failures involving Windows 10 paths, stored credentials, and large permission policies; Linux startup with nested writable roots; and macOS system path aliases.	Run OS-specific canaries using placeholder paths, trusted test repositories, and representative permission profiles.	Do not generalize from one operating system, image, shell, repository, or workspace policy to another.
Mermaid and command-completion reporting	The release fixes Mermaid quoted labels and ampersands, and command completion events that lacked early output or launch-failure detail.	Validate diagrams and completion logs used in release documentation, incident reports, and approval packets.	Evidence is acceptable only when retained, attributable, redacted, and reproducible enough for a reviewer to understand.

A safe prompt for this release should ask for a bounded plan, not an unbounded action. For example, a platform team can ask Codex to inspect a trusted repository for Codex configuration files, list current assumptions, propose a canary test matrix, and identify missing evidence. It should not ask Codex to discover unknown hosts, harvest tokens from local files, scrape logs for secrets, override endpoint controls, or change approval settings to make a task complete faster. The prompts later in this article use “do not execute changes” language because a model-generated runbook is not equivalent to an approved platform change.

How to use these prompts without turning them into uncontrolled automation

Each prompt section in this masterclass has five fixed labels: Purpose, Copy-paste prompt, Required inputs, Expected output, and Verification checkpoint. The copy-paste prompt is the contract you can paste into Codex or adapt into an internal assistant workflow, while the required inputs tell the human operator what placeholder values must be supplied. The expected output defines the artifact Codex should produce, and the verification checkpoint tells the platform owner what must be checked before acting on the artifact.

Before using any prompt, prepare a scoped work packet. The packet should identify the accountable owner, authorized environment, Codex version target, operating systems in scope, repository or workspace names as placeholders, MCP servers as placeholders, approval policy assumptions, sandbox roots as placeholders, test fixtures, rollback owner, evidence destination, and a clear stop condition. If the work packet cannot name the owner, scope, or rollback path, the prompt should be used only to draft an inventory checklist, not to perform configuration analysis.

Read-only discovery should collect facts such as version output, configuration file presence, trusted project status, permission profile names, sandbox root structure, MCP server entries, registered callback placeholders, enabled and disabled tool lists, and approval-review history that can be safely summarized. It should not collect secrets, bearer tokens, raw private logs, customer records, proprietary source snippets unrelated to the change, production incident details beyond the approved scope, or personal data. When a log is needed, provide a redacted excerpt or ask Codex to specify the log fields required so a human can extract a sanitized sample.

Representative test fixtures matter because Codex 0.158 touches platform behaviors that can vary by account, plan, app, operating system, shell, workspace policy, repository trust, MCP host, and local configuration. A passing test on one macOS laptop does not validate a Windows 10 path case, a Linux nested writable-root case, a direct exec-server WebSocket path, or an MCP OAuth callback. Treat each fixture as evidence for that fixture only, and require a human to decide whether the sample is representative enough for the next rollout stage.

Use Git checkpoints before and after repository tasks, consistent with OpenAI’s CLI guidance. A checkpoint does not make a destructive change safe, but it gives reviewers a concrete diff, supports rollback in source-controlled work, and helps separate model-proposed edits from human-approved commits. For non-Git assets such as local configuration, MCP registration records, workspace policy, secret-manager entries, or infrastructure settings, use your organization’s equivalent backup, export, ticket, or change snapshot procedure before any approved change is applied.

This article offers 25 ChatGPT-5.5 and Codex prompts for product engineering teams covering bug triage, design reviews, remote-agent tasks, strategic documents, release evidence, and rollback planning. The 25 ChatGPT-5.5 and Codex Prompts for Product Engineering Teams: Bug Triage, Design Reviews, Remote Agents, Strategic Documents, and Release Evidence article is a focused companion for Platform Release Evidence because the title and excerpt directly include release evidence and engineering-team workflows, matching the marker’s platform release-evidence context.

Prompt-engineering rules that keep the library auditable

OpenAI’s prompt-engineering guidance supports clear task instructions, relevant context, output constraints, and iterative evaluation. In this article, those ideas are applied as operational controls: every prompt names the role Codex should play, limits the authorized scope, requires placeholders instead of secrets, demands read-only analysis first, asks for structured artifacts, and defines a verification checkpoint. The goal is to make the output reviewable by a platform engineer who was not present for the original chat.

A good platform prompt contains explicit non-goals. It should tell Codex not to bypass authentication, not to weaken sandboxing, not to disable endpoint protection, not to expand network access, not to alter organization policy, not to approve its own elevated command, and not to infer permission from technical reachability. These constraints reduce ambiguity when the model is asked to solve a configuration problem that could otherwise be “fixed” by broadening access.

A good platform prompt also separates observation from recommendation. Observation includes what configuration files appear to exist, which placeholder MCP servers are listed, which operating systems need fixtures, and which approval events should be captured. Recommendation includes proposed changes, risk ratings, sequencing, rollback steps, and reviewer questions. Final action belongs to the human operator and the organization’s change process, not to the prompt output.

The expected output should be structured because unstructured prose is hard to approve. Most prompts below ask for tables, ordered test steps, evidence manifests, risk registers, or release packets. A table that maps <WORKSTATION_GROUP> to <OS_VERSION>, <SANDBOX_PROFILE>, <TEST_REPOSITORY>, expected result, observed result, and reviewer decision is more useful than a paragraph saying “the rollout looks good.” Structured output also makes it easier to redact, attach to a ticket, compare across canaries, and preserve for audit.

Operational warning: prompts can help produce plans, checklists, and evidence packets, but they do not prove that a Codex deployment is secure, compliant, correctly configured, or suitable for production. Security assurance still requires human review, environment-specific testing, credential governance, logging review, policy alignment, incident planning, and rollback validation.

The evaluation mindset: plans and artifacts are not proof

OpenAI’s evaluations guidance is relevant because a Codex rollout should be tested against representative tasks rather than judged by whether a single demo succeeds. For this article, an evaluation means a defined fixture, expected behavior, observed behavior, failure taxonomy, reviewer decision, and retained evidence. A fixture could be a Windows 10 path sandbox case, a Linux nested writable-root startup case, a macOS alias path case, an MCP OAuth callback validation case, an elevated command approval case, or a Mermaid rendering case with quoted labels and ampersands.

The prompts below therefore ask Codex to design test artifacts and evidence manifests, not to pronounce the environment secure. A useful artifact might say: “For <CANARY_GROUP_A>, verify that an elevated command triggers terminal input approval, that the proposed command is visible to the reviewer, that denial stops execution, and that the transcript is redacted before attachment to <CHANGE_TICKET>.” That artifact gives a human a concrete test. It does not prove that every elevated-command path in every environment is safe.

Release evidence should be sufficient for a future investigator to answer five questions: what was in scope, what was changed, who approved it, what was tested, and how rollback would occur. Evidence can include redacted transcripts, version confirmations, configuration diffs without secrets, Git checkpoint hashes, canary matrices, approval screenshots or exported approval records where policy permits, test logs with sensitive fields removed, and reviewer sign-off. Evidence should not include tokens, client secrets, personal data, private customer content, or unrestricted log dumps.

When a prompt output conflicts with official documentation, workspace policy, local security guidance, or a human reviewer’s judgment, the prompt output loses. Current Codex behavior can vary by plan, account, app, region, rollout stage, repository trust state, and workspace policy, and this article cannot promise that every documented capability is available or behaves identically in your environment. Treat every generated recommendation as a hypothesis to verify against current first-party documentation and your local controls.

What the 25 prompts will cover

The 25 prompt contracts that follow are organized around the operational surfaces most likely to matter during a Codex 0.158 rollout. The early prompts focus on inventory, version confirmation, configuration boundaries, Git checkpoints, read-only discovery, and canary planning. The middle prompts cover Windows path compatibility, Linux nested writable roots, macOS system path aliases, MCP pre-registered OAuth clients, exact callback verification, OAuth secret handling, bearer-token protection for direct exec-server WebSocket connections, and narrow tool allowlists. The later prompts address elevated-command approvals, runtime-only grants, transcript copying and redaction, Mermaid rendering, command-completion events, rollback, release evidence, and final platform-owner sign-off.

Each prompt is intentionally written so that a team can use it in a controlled environment without exposing secrets or asking Codex to exceed authorization. Replace placeholders with non-sensitive identifiers, keep credentials in your approved secret-management system, attach only redacted evidence to tickets, and require a human owner to approve any action that changes configuration, permissions, repositories, services, infrastructure, authentication, publication status, or release scope. If a prompt produces a plan that asks for broader access than the task requires, reject that plan and rerun with narrower boundaries.

The most important success criterion is not whether Codex produces a confident answer. It is whether the platform team ends the rollout with a documented, reviewed, reversible, least-privilege change supported by representative evidence. Codex 0.158 may make some workflows smoother and fix specific defects described by OpenAI, but the platform obligation remains the same: verify behavior in your environment, protect credentials, preserve approvals, minimize blast radius, and keep a rollback path ready until the release is accepted by accountable humans.

Prompts 1–9: inventory, baselines, checkpoints, platform fixes, and rendering regressions

The first nine prompts are designed for the earliest, lowest-risk phase of a Codex CLI 0.158 rollout: inventory what exists, confirm the version baseline, capture reversible Git state, and test the operating-system fixes that OpenAI lists in the 0.158 release notes. They deliberately avoid production writes, broad network access, credential disclosure, or unattended remediation. Each prompt asks Codex to work as a diagnostic assistant and release-evidence drafter, not as an autonomous administrator.

OpenAI’s Codex CLI documentation recommends Git checkpoints before and after tasks, and the configuration reference states that user configuration lives at ~/.codex/config.toml while project-scoped configuration is loaded only for trusted projects. Treat those facts as operational boundaries: gather configuration facts, classify risk, and ask a human platform owner to approve any modification. If a workspace policy, endpoint tool, or repository owner imposes stricter controls than a prompt suggests, the stricter rule wins.

This article covers OpenAI Codex v0.135 with Windows desktop control, enhanced diagnostics, the Codex Doctor diagnostics suite, and memory architecture. The OpenAI Codex v0.135: Windows Desktop Control, Enhanced Diagnostics, and Memory Architecture article is a focused companion for Codex Sandbox Diagnostics because it directly addresses Codex diagnostics and related system-integration capabilities, making it the closest semantic match for sandbox diagnostics.

Prompt 1: Upgrade inventory and rollout scope map

Purpose

Use this prompt before upgrading any workstation, CI runner, or controlled agent host. It asks Codex to build an inventory of Codex CLI installation state, operating-system coverage, trusted projects, MCP configuration references, sandbox profiles, and approval policies using read-only inspection first. This is the prompt to run when the team needs to know whether Codex 0.158 is a narrow workstation update, a shared platform change, or a staged release touching multiple developer environments.

Copy-paste prompt

You are assisting an authorized platform-engineering rollout for Codex CLI 0.158 on systems I own or am explicitly authorized to administer. Do not access, request, reveal, copy, or store real credentials, OAuth client secrets, bearer tokens, API keys, private keys, account numbers, personal data, privileged legal material, or confidential business content. Use placeholders only, such as <HOSTNAME>, <REPOSITORY_PATH>, <MCP_SERVER_NAME>, <OAUTH_CLIENT_ID>, <OAUTH_CLIENT_SECRET_PLACEHOLDER>, <BEARER_TOKEN_ENV_VAR>, and <LOG_PATH>. If a file appears to contain secrets, report only its path, type, owner, and redaction requirement; never print the secret value.

Start with read-only discovery. Do not modify files, install software, change permissions, edit Codex configuration, start network listeners, connect to third-party services, run destructive commands, or alter Git state unless I explicitly approve a later step. Follow least privilege: inspect only the directories, repositories, hosts, and configuration files I name. Respect sandboxing, authentication, endpoint protection, organizational policy, workspace controls, and third-party terms. Do not propose bypasses.

Task: create an upgrade inventory and rollout scope map for Codex CLI 0.158. Use the following inputs:
- Authorized hosts or host classes: <HOST_LIST_OR_CLASSES>
- Authorized repositories or workspaces: <REPOSITORY_PATHS>
- Operating systems in scope: <WINDOWS_LINUX_MACOS_SCOPE>
- Current Codex install method if known: <INSTALL_METHOD>
- Current Codex configuration locations to inspect: <CONFIG_PATHS>
- MCP servers in scope: <MCP_SERVER_NAMES_OR_NONE>
- Sandbox profiles or writable roots to inspect: <SANDBOX_PROFILE_NAMES_OR_PATHS>
- Approval policy owner: <PLATFORM_OWNER>
- Evidence destination: <EVIDENCE_FOLDER>

Required method:
1. List read-only commands or inspections before executing them, and wait for my approval if any command could disclose sensitive metadata beyond the approved scope.
2. Identify current Codex version evidence, install source evidence, user config path evidence, trusted project config evidence, MCP configuration references, sandbox profile references, and approval policy references.
3. Classify each host or workspace as not assessed, ready for canary, blocked pending owner input, blocked pending credential handling, blocked pending policy review, or out of scope.
4. Capture evidence as redacted tables and file references only. Do not include secret values or unnecessary personal data.
5. Require backups or Git checkpoints before any later change.
6. Require representative test fixtures for Windows paths, Linux writable roots, macOS aliases, Mermaid rendering, approvals, MCP OAuth, and WebSocket bearer authentication if those features are in scope.
7. Propose a rollback and hold point for every rollout group.
8. Mark all recommendations as recommendations, not executed changes.
9. A human platform owner must verify the inventory and approve any upgrade, configuration change, network change, permission change, or production rollout.

Return:
- Inventory table
- Unknowns and blocked items
- Redaction notes
- Suggested canary groups
- Evidence checklist
- Human approval checklist
- Rollback readiness checklist

Required inputs

• Host list, endpoint group, or workstation class names that the platform team is authorized to assess.
• Repository paths or workspace roots, limited to projects where inspection is approved.
• Known Codex install method, if the team tracks package source or standalone install state.
• Configuration paths, including expected user configuration at ~/.codex/config.toml and any trusted project configuration locations.
• Names of MCP servers, sandbox profiles, and approval-policy owners if already known.

Expected output

Codex should return an inventory table that separates confirmed evidence from assumptions. A useful result distinguishes “not installed,” “installed but version not confirmed,” “version confirmed,” “configuration present,” “MCP present,” “sandbox profile present,” and “requires owner review.” It should also flag any host where inspection would require credentials, elevated rights, or access outside the named scope.

Verification checkpoint

A human platform owner should verify that every host, repository, MCP server, and sandbox root in the inventory is actually authorized for assessment. Do not continue to installation, configuration, or network testing until the owner accepts the scope map and confirms that evidence storage does not expose secrets or unnecessary confidential metadata.

Prompt 2: Version baseline and release-note delta assessment

Purpose

This prompt turns the Codex 0.158 release notes into a local baseline comparison. It asks Codex to compare the installed version and local risk surface with the release-note areas that matter to platform teams: terminal approval defaults, MCP OAuth pre-registered client secret support, direct exec-server WebSocket bearer-token protection, Windows fixes, Linux nested writable roots, macOS path aliases, Mermaid rendering, and completion-event detail.

Copy-paste prompt

You are assisting an authorized Codex CLI version-baseline review on systems I own or am explicitly authorized to administer. Do not request, reveal, copy, store, or infer real credentials, OAuth client secrets, bearer tokens, API keys, private keys, personal data, privileged content, or confidential business data. Use placeholders only: <HOSTNAME>, <REPOSITORY_PATH>, <CURRENT_CODEX_VERSION>, <TARGET_CODEX_VERSION>, <OAUTH_CLIENT_SECRET_PLACEHOLDER>, <BEARER_TOKEN_ENV_VAR>, <EVIDENCE_FOLDER>. If any output contains a secret-like value, redact it and report the redaction.

Begin with read-only discovery only. Do not install, update, downgrade, edit files, change approval settings, alter sandbox settings, start services, open network connections, or run elevated commands unless I explicitly approve a separate step. Follow least privilege and inspect only the host, project, and config paths I provide. Do not bypass authentication, sandboxing, approvals, endpoint controls, workspace policy, or third-party terms.

Task: produce a version baseline and Codex 0.158 release-note delta assessment.

Inputs:
- Host or workspace: <HOSTNAME_OR_WORKSPACE>
- Current version evidence, if known: <CURRENT_CODEX_VERSION_OR_UNKNOWN>
- Target version: 0.158
- Codex executable path or install method, if known: <CODEX_PATH_OR_INSTALL_METHOD>
- Approved repositories: <REPOSITORY_PATHS>
- Approved config paths: <CONFIG_PATHS>
- Features used locally: <MCP_OAUTH_WEBSOCKET_SANDBOX_MERMAID_APPROVALS_COMPLETION_EVENTS>
- Evidence destination: <EVIDENCE_FOLDER>

Required method:
1. Ask for approval before running any command that reads outside the named paths or could disclose sensitive environment data.
2. Confirm the installed Codex version using approved local evidence and record the command or file used.
3. Compare local usage with the Codex 0.158 areas that OpenAI lists in the release notes: copy-on-select and right-click paste in fullscreen TUI, Markdown-preserving transcript copy, MCP OAuth client secret support for pre-registered clients, bearer-token protection for direct exec-server WebSocket connections, elevated terminal input approval enabled by default, fewer unnecessary repeat reviews for runtime-only grants, Windows sandbox path and stored-credential fixes, Linux nested writable-root startup fix, macOS system path alias fix, Mermaid quoted-label and ampersand rendering fix, and command-completion event detail improvements.
4. Mark each area as applicable, not applicable, unknown, or requires canary validation.
5. Do not claim the release makes unsafe commands safe, automatically secures MCP clients, guarantees transparent outputs, or removes approval review.
6. Require backups or Git checkpoints before later changes.
7. Require representative fixtures and redacted evidence for any validation.
8. Recommend rollback criteria and a human hold point.
9. A human platform owner must verify findings and approve upgrade, configuration, or policy changes.

Return:
- Version evidence
- Release-note delta table
- Local applicability assessment
- Test fixtures needed
- Risks and unknowns
- Approval requirements
- Rollback criteria
- Evidence manifest

Required inputs

• Current Codex version evidence, if already captured, or permission to run a read-only version check.
• List of Codex features used locally, especially MCP, direct WebSocket access, custom sandbox profiles, approvals, and transcript workflows.
• Approved repository and configuration paths for inspection.
• Evidence folder where redacted findings may be saved.

Expected output

The expected output is a delta table that says which 0.158 changes matter to the environment and why. For example, a team that does not run MCP servers should see MCP OAuth marked “not applicable” or “unknown,” while a team using pre-registered OAuth clients should see it marked “requires canary validation” with a reminder to use only placeholder secrets in reports.

Verification checkpoint

Confirm that the target version is really 0.158 and that the baseline evidence comes from the actual executable or managed package in use. If multiple Codex installations exist on the same host, require the owner to decide which path is authoritative before interpreting test results.

Prompt 3: Git checkpoints before and after Codex tasks

Purpose

OpenAI’s Codex CLI documentation recommends Git checkpoints before and after tasks. This prompt helps a developer or platform engineer ask Codex to assess repository cleanliness, propose checkpoint commands, and prepare evidence without committing secrets or unrelated changes. It is especially useful before sandbox diagnostics or configuration validation that may generate logs, test fixtures, or temporary files.

Copy-paste prompt

You are assisting with Git checkpoint planning for an authorized Codex CLI 0.158 validation task in repositories I own or am explicitly authorized to administer. Do not request, reveal, copy, commit, store, or print real credentials, OAuth client secrets, bearer tokens, API keys, private keys, personal data, privileged material, or confidential content. Use placeholders only, including <REPOSITORY_PATH>, <BRANCH_NAME>, <CHECKPOINT_LABEL>, <EVIDENCE_FOLDER>, <SECRET_FILE_PATTERN>. If you detect secret-like content or sensitive files, report only redacted metadata and exclusion guidance.

Start with read-only discovery. Do not create commits, branches, tags, stashes, files, or changes unless I explicitly approve the exact command sequence. Do not run destructive Git commands, force pushes, history rewrites, credential-helper changes, permission changes, or remote operations without explicit human approval. Follow least privilege and inspect only the named repository paths. Do not bypass pre-commit hooks, branch protections, code review, signing policy, endpoint controls, approvals, or organizational policy.

Task: prepare a Git checkpoint plan before and after Codex CLI 0.158 validation.

Inputs:
- Repository path: <REPOSITORY_PATH>
- Current branch or intended validation branch: <BRANCH_NAME>
- Validation task name: <CHECKPOINT_LABEL>
- Files expected to change, if any: <EXPECTED_FILES_OR_NONE>
- Files that must never be committed: <SECRET_OR_LOCAL_ONLY_PATTERNS>
- Evidence destination: <EVIDENCE_FOLDER>
- Human approver: <PLATFORM_OWNER>

Required method:
1. Propose read-only Git status, branch, diff, and ignored-file inspections before running them.
2. Identify uncommitted changes, untracked files, ignored files that matter to validation, and suspicious secret-like files without printing their contents.
3. Recommend a pre-task checkpoint strategy: clean working tree, temporary branch, stash, commit, or documented exception. Explain tradeoffs.
4. Recommend a post-task checkpoint strategy: review diff, redact logs, exclude local credentials, run tests if approved, commit only intentional files, and preserve rollback path.
5. Require backups or Git checkpoints before any file modification.
6. Require human approval before creating a branch, committing, stashing, deleting files, applying patches, changing remotes, or pushing.
7. Do not bypass authentication, approvals, sandboxing, repository protections, or third-party terms.
8. Capture evidence as redacted status summaries, command list, and decision log.
9. A human platform owner must verify the plan and approve any Git operation beyond read-only inspection.

Return:
- Pre-task repository state checklist
- Recommended checkpoint option
- Exact commands proposed but not executed
- Files to exclude or redact
- Post-task review checklist
- Rollback command candidates, clearly marked as requiring approval
- Evidence manifest
- Human approval gate

Required inputs

• Repository path and intended branch name.
• Validation task label, such as “codex-0.158-windows-path-canary” or “codex-0.158-mermaid-fixtures.”
• Known files that may change and patterns that must never be committed, such as local environment files, credentials, logs with tokens, or machine-specific config.
• Name or role of the human approver.

Expected output

Codex should produce a checkpoint plan rather than immediately touching Git state. A strong output includes read-only commands, a clean-tree decision, exclusion rules, a post-task diff-review procedure, and rollback candidates that remain unexecuted until approved.

Verification checkpoint

The human reviewer should compare the proposed Git commands with local repository policy. If a repository uses protected branches, required reviews, signed commits, or automated secret scanning, the checkpoint plan must preserve those controls rather than routing around them.

Prompt 4: Windows path compatibility sandbox canary

Purpose

OpenAI’s Codex 0.158 release notes describe fixes for Windows sandbox failures involving Windows 10 paths and large permission policies. This prompt asks Codex to design and run, only with approval, a non-production Windows canary that exercises representative paths without touching sensitive directories or broadening sandbox permissions. It is intended for platform teams that previously saw Windows-specific startup, path translation, or sandbox-policy failures.

Copy-paste prompt

You are assisting an authorized Windows Codex CLI 0.158 sandbox canary on systems I own or am explicitly authorized to administer. Do not request, reveal, copy, store, or print real credentials, OAuth client secrets, bearer tokens, API keys, private keys, personal data, privileged material, or confidential business content. Use placeholders only: <WINDOWS_HOST>, <REPOSITORY_PATH>, <USER_PROFILE_PATH>, <SANDBOX_PROFILE>, <TEST_ROOT>, <EVIDENCE_FOLDER>. If you encounter secret-like files or sensitive directory names, redact them and report only the minimum metadata needed for diagnosis.

Begin with read-only discovery. Do not modify files, install or update Codex, change sandbox profiles, change permissions, run elevated commands, disable security tools, access protected directories, or execute destructive commands unless I explicitly approve a specific later step. Follow least privilege: use a disposable test root and approved repository only. Do not bypass authentication, approvals, sandboxing, endpoint protection, organizational policy, or third-party terms.

Task: create a Windows path compatibility canary for Codex CLI 0.158.

Inputs:
- Windows host or test VM: <WINDOWS_HOST>
- Codex target version: 0.158
- Approved repository path: <REPOSITORY_PATH>
- Disposable test root: <TEST_ROOT>
- Path patterns to validate: <SPACES_LONG_PATHS_WINDOWS_10_STYLE_PATHS_CASE_VARIANTS>
- Sandbox profile or permission policy reference: <SANDBOX_PROFILE>
- Evidence destination: <EVIDENCE_FOLDER>
- Human approver: <PLATFORM_OWNER>

Required method:
1. Propose read-only environment, version, path, and sandbox-profile inspections first.
2. Build a canary matrix for representative Windows paths, including paths with spaces, nested folders, long-but-policy-compliant names, and the specific Windows 10-style path patterns we approve.
3. Use only disposable test files under <TEST_ROOT> after approval; never use real secrets, production data, user document folders, browser profiles, credential stores, or system directories.
4. Require a Git checkpoint before any repository modification.
5. Keep permissions narrow and do not enlarge sandbox roots unless a human owner approves the exact change.
6. Capture command output, launch failures, early output, and sandbox errors with redaction.
7. Separate product behavior evidence from local policy or endpoint-tool behavior.
8. Define pass, fail, inconclusive, and blocked criteria.
9. A human platform owner must verify results and approve any remediation, upgrade expansion, permission change, or production rollout.

Return:
- Canary matrix
- Proposed commands, marked read-only or requires approval
- Expected safe test files
- Evidence collection plan
- Pass/fail criteria
- Risks and redactions
- Rollback and cleanup plan
- Human approval gate

Required inputs

• Windows host or test VM identifier that is approved for canary testing.
• Disposable test root path, not a real user documents folder, browser profile, credential store, or production repository root.
• Path patterns that reflect actual developer usage, such as paths with spaces or deeply nested workspace directories.
• Sandbox profile or permission policy reference that should be tested without broadening access.

Expected output

The expected output is a Windows canary matrix with commands classified as read-only or approval-required. The plan should record launch failures and early command output because OpenAI notes that 0.158 also improves command-completion events that previously lacked early output or launch-failure detail.

Verification checkpoint

A Windows platform owner should verify that every test path is disposable and that the sandbox policy tested is the policy intended for the canary group. If the canary requires elevated access to reproduce a failure, stop and convert the action into a separate approval request.

Prompt 5: Windows stored-credential repair validation

Purpose

OpenAI’s 0.158 release notes include a fix for Windows sandbox failures involving stored credentials. This prompt helps teams validate the repair without exposing secrets, dumping credential stores, or changing authentication state. The diagnostic focus is whether Codex can operate safely in an approved Windows environment when credential-related sandbox failures were previously observed.

Copy-paste prompt

You are assisting an authorized Windows stored-credential sandbox validation for Codex CLI 0.158 on systems I own or am explicitly authorized to administer. Do not request, reveal, enumerate, copy, export, print, store, or test real passwords, tokens, OAuth client secrets, bearer tokens, API keys, private keys, session cookies, credential-store entries, personal data, privileged material, or confidential content. Use placeholders only: <WINDOWS_HOST>, <REPOSITORY_PATH>, <CREDENTIAL_REFERENCE_LABEL>, <SANDBOX_PROFILE>, <EVIDENCE_FOLDER>. If credential-related errors appear, redact values and report only error class, timestamp, tool, and approved path.

Start with read-only discovery. Do not open credential managers, dump environment variables, run credential-export commands, alter saved credentials, clear caches, sign in or out, change authentication helpers, modify permissions, disable endpoint controls, or run elevated commands unless a human owner explicitly approves a separate, documented action. Follow least privilege and inspect only the approved repository, Codex version evidence, and sandbox policy references. Do not bypass authentication, approvals, sandboxing, organizational policy, endpoint protection, or third-party terms.

Task: validate whether a prior Windows stored-credential-related Codex sandbox failure is resolved in Codex CLI 0.158 without exposing credential material.

Inputs:
- Windows host or canary VM: <WINDOWS_HOST>
- Codex target version: 0.158
- Approved repository path: <REPOSITORY_PATH>
- Prior failure summary with secrets removed: <REDACTED_PRIOR_FAILURE_SUMMARY>
- Credential reference label, not value: <CREDENTIAL_REFERENCE_LABEL>
- Sandbox profile or policy reference: <SANDBOX_PROFILE>
- Evidence destination: <EVIDENCE_FOLDER>
- Human approver: <PLATFORM_OWNER>

Required method:
1. Ask before running any command. Classify each proposed command as read-only, writes disposable evidence, requires approval, or prohibited.
2. Confirm Codex version and sandbox profile using redacted evidence.
3. Reproduce only the minimal safe workflow that previously triggered the stored-credential sandbox failure, using placeholder credentials or an already-authorized session without printing credential contents.
4. Do not inspect credential values. Do not ask me to paste secrets. Do not include secrets in prompts, logs, shell history, files, or generated output.
5. Capture errors, timestamps, command categories, and redacted stack or diagnostic messages if available.
6. Require backups or Git checkpoints before any repository changes.
7. Define success as “prior failure no longer reproduced in this approved fixture,” not as a guarantee that credential handling is universally secure.
8. Define rollback and escalation criteria if the failure persists.
9. A human platform owner must verify findings and approve any credential repair, policy change, upgrade expansion, or production rollout.

Return:
- Safe reproduction plan
- Prohibited actions list
- Proposed command table
- Redacted evidence template
- Result classification
- Residual risk notes
- Escalation and rollback criteria
- Human verification checklist

Required inputs

• Redacted summary of the previous Windows stored-credential-related failure.
• Credential reference label only, such as the name of an approved authentication flow, never the secret value.
• Approved repository and sandbox profile.
• Evidence destination that is access-controlled and appropriate for redacted diagnostic artifacts.

Expected output

Codex should produce a safe reproduction plan with a prohibited-actions list. The output should make clear that credential values are not to be inspected, exported, or pasted, and that a passed canary proves only that the prior failure did not reproduce under the approved fixture.

Verification checkpoint

A human reviewer should inspect the evidence for accidental credential disclosure before it enters a ticket, pull request, release note, or incident record. If any secret-like value appears, treat the artifact as sensitive and follow the organization’s credential-handling process before sharing it further.

This guide explains Codex Approval Policies for enterprise governance, including human-in-the-loop approvals, automated controls, auditability, safety, privacy, and cost guardrails. The The Complete Guide to Codex Approval Policies — Controlling AI Autonomy in Enterprise Environments article is a focused companion for Command Approval Policy because it directly covers Codex approval policies and control of AI autonomy, which aligns with command approval policy decisions in platform engineering workflows.

Prompt 6: Linux nested writable-roots startup validation

Purpose

OpenAI’s 0.158 release notes describe a Linux startup fix involving nested writable roots. This prompt creates a conservative validation plan for Linux hosts where Codex sandbox configuration includes overlapping writable paths. The goal is to identify whether Codex starts and enforces the intended boundaries, not to expand writable access for convenience.

Copy-paste prompt

You are assisting an authorized Linux nested writable-roots validation for Codex CLI 0.158 on systems I own or am explicitly authorized to administer. Do not request, reveal, copy, store, or print real credentials, OAuth client secrets, bearer tokens, API keys, private keys, SSH keys, personal data, privileged content, or confidential business data. Use placeholders only: <LINUX_HOST>, <REPOSITORY_PATH>, <OUTER_WRITABLE_ROOT>, <INNER_WRITABLE_ROOT>, <SANDBOX_PROFILE>, <EVIDENCE_FOLDER>. If files appear sensitive, report redacted metadata only and do not print contents.

Begin with read-only discovery. Do not modify sandbox profiles, create or delete directories, change file ownership, change permissions, run elevated commands, mount filesystems, alter security controls, or write test files unless I explicitly approve the exact step. Follow least privilege. Use only approved disposable paths for write tests. Do not bypass authentication, approvals, sandboxing, Linux security policy, endpoint protection, organizational policy, or third-party terms.

Task: validate Codex CLI 0.158 startup behavior with Linux nested writable roots.

Inputs:
- Linux host or container: <LINUX_HOST>
- Codex target version: 0.158
- Approved repository path: <REPOSITORY_PATH>
- Sandbox profile reference: <SANDBOX_PROFILE>
- Outer writable root: <OUTER_WRITABLE_ROOT>
- Inner writable root: <INNER_WRITABLE_ROOT>
- Disposable fixture path: <DISPOSABLE_FIXTURE_PATH>
- Evidence destination: <EVIDENCE_FOLDER>
- Human approver: <PLATFORM_OWNER>

Required method:
1. Propose read-only inspection of Codex version, sandbox profile, configured writable roots, path ownership, and repository state.
2. Identify whether writable roots are nested, overlapping, duplicated, symlinked, or outside the approved scope.
3. Do not resolve symlinks into sensitive locations without approval; flag ambiguous paths for human review.
4. Require Git checkpoints before repository writes and use disposable fixtures for write validation.
5. If approved, test startup and minimal read/write behavior only within approved writable roots; verify that unapproved paths remain out of scope.
6. Capture launch failures, early output, sandbox errors, and command-completion evidence with redaction.
7. Classify results as pass, fail, inconclusive, or blocked by policy.
8. Recommend remediation only as proposed changes requiring human approval.
9. A human platform owner must verify results and approve any sandbox-root change, permission change, or rollout.

Return:
- Writable-root topology table
- Proposed command plan
- Approved disposable fixture plan
- Boundary checks
- Evidence template
- Result classification
- Remediation recommendations requiring approval
- Rollback and cleanup checklist

Required inputs

• Linux host, VM, container, or workstation identifier in the authorized test scope.
• Sandbox profile reference and the exact outer and inner writable-root paths to validate.
• Disposable fixture path for any approved write test.
• Repository path if Git checkpointing or repository interaction is part of the test.

Expected output

The expected output is a topology table that identifies nested, overlapping, duplicated, or ambiguous writable roots. It should propose minimal tests that verify startup and boundary behavior while preserving the principle that writable roots should stay narrow and purposeful.

Verification checkpoint

A Linux platform owner should verify that the writable roots do not include home directories, system directories, secret stores, or broad mounts by accident. If symlinks or bind mounts make the effective boundary unclear, classify the result as blocked or inconclusive until the path topology is reviewed manually.

Prompt 7: Protect Git metadata during validation

Purpose

Design a harmless validation plan that confirms Codex 0.158 respects repository metadata boundaries while testing only an authorized disposable repository and preserving checkpoints.

Copy-paste prompt

You are assisting an authorized platform-engineering team with Codex CLI 0.158 on systems I own or am explicitly authorized to administer. Begin with read-only discovery. Work only within the named hosts, repositories, paths, MCP servers, and test environments.

Never request, reveal, copy, store, or print real credentials, OAuth client secrets, bearer tokens, API keys, private keys, personal data, or confidential content. Use placeholders or approved environment-variable names only, including <HOSTNAME>, <REPOSITORY_PATH>, <MCP_SERVER_NAME>, <OAUTH_CLIENT_ID>, <OAUTH_CLIENT_SECRET_ENV_VAR>, <BEARER_TOKEN_ENV_VAR>, and <EVIDENCE_PATH>. If sensitive material appears, stop and report only the location and redaction requirement.

Follow least privilege and use the minimum necessary scope. Keep tool and domain allowlists narrow. Do not disable authentication, approvals, sandboxing, endpoint protection, logging, or organizational policy. Do not make changes, run elevated or destructive commands, start listeners, contact third-party systems, or alter production unless a named human owner explicitly approves the exact step.

Require a backup or Git checkpoint before any approved write. Use disposable, non-production fixtures. Capture redacted evidence, classify results as pass, fail, inconclusive, or blocked, define stop conditions, and provide a tested rollback or revert path. A human platform owner and security reviewer must verify the output and approve any implementation.

Task: Design a harmless validation plan that confirms Codex 0.158 respects repository metadata boundaries while testing only an authorized disposable repository and preserving checkpoints.

Authorized inputs:
Authorized repository path, disposable branch or fixture, current sandbox profile, permitted write paths, evidence destination, and named approvers.

Return a concise plan, proposed read-only checks, expected evidence, failure classifications, approval gates, cleanup steps, rollback conditions, and a human sign-off checklist.

Required inputs

Authorized repository path, disposable branch or fixture, current sandbox profile, permitted write paths, evidence destination, and named approvers.

Expected output

A read-only inventory, minimal fixture plan, explicit metadata boundaries, proposed checks, evidence table, cleanup, and rollback plan.

Verification checkpoint

A human repository owner must verify that `.git` metadata, hooks, credentials, and unrelated repositories remain untouched and approve any fixture write.

Prompt 8: Validate macOS path aliases safely

Purpose

Create a non-destructive test plan for documented macOS system-path alias behavior after the Codex 0.158 upgrade without broadening filesystem access.

Copy-paste prompt

You are assisting an authorized platform-engineering team with Codex CLI 0.158 on systems I own or am explicitly authorized to administer. Begin with read-only discovery. Work only within the named hosts, repositories, paths, MCP servers, and test environments.

Never request, reveal, copy, store, or print real credentials, OAuth client secrets, bearer tokens, API keys, private keys, personal data, or confidential content. Use placeholders or approved environment-variable names only, including <HOSTNAME>, <REPOSITORY_PATH>, <MCP_SERVER_NAME>, <OAUTH_CLIENT_ID>, <OAUTH_CLIENT_SECRET_ENV_VAR>, <BEARER_TOKEN_ENV_VAR>, and <EVIDENCE_PATH>. If sensitive material appears, stop and report only the location and redaction requirement.

Follow least privilege and use the minimum necessary scope. Keep tool and domain allowlists narrow. Do not disable authentication, approvals, sandboxing, endpoint protection, logging, or organizational policy. Do not make changes, run elevated or destructive commands, start listeners, contact third-party systems, or alter production unless a named human owner explicitly approves the exact step.

Require a backup or Git checkpoint before any approved write. Use disposable, non-production fixtures. Capture redacted evidence, classify results as pass, fail, inconclusive, or blocked, define stop conditions, and provide a tested rollback or revert path. A human platform owner and security reviewer must verify the output and approve any implementation.

Task: Create a non-destructive test plan for documented macOS system-path alias behavior after the Codex 0.158 upgrade without broadening filesystem access.

Authorized inputs:
Authorized macOS host, exact alias and canonical paths, current sandbox profile, harmless fixture directory, version evidence, and rollback owner.

Return a concise plan, proposed read-only checks, expected evidence, failure classifications, approval gates, cleanup steps, rollback conditions, and a human sign-off checklist.

Required inputs

Authorized macOS host, exact alias and canonical paths, current sandbox profile, harmless fixture directory, version evidence, and rollback owner.

Expected output

An alias-to-canonical-path map, proposed read-only checks, narrow fixture writes only if approved, boundary results, and rollback evidence.

Verification checkpoint

A macOS platform owner must confirm that aliases resolve only to intended paths and that protected, home, keychain, and unrelated system locations remain outside scope.

Prompt 9: Verify Mermaid quoted labels and ampersands

Purpose

Prepare a fixture-based validation for Codex 0.158 Mermaid rendering changes using synthetic diagrams with quoted labels and ampersands, without importing confidential architecture.

Copy-paste prompt

You are assisting an authorized platform-engineering team with Codex CLI 0.158 on systems I own or am explicitly authorized to administer. Begin with read-only discovery. Work only within the named hosts, repositories, paths, MCP servers, and test environments.

Never request, reveal, copy, store, or print real credentials, OAuth client secrets, bearer tokens, API keys, private keys, personal data, or confidential content. Use placeholders or approved environment-variable names only, including <HOSTNAME>, <REPOSITORY_PATH>, <MCP_SERVER_NAME>, <OAUTH_CLIENT_ID>, <OAUTH_CLIENT_SECRET_ENV_VAR>, <BEARER_TOKEN_ENV_VAR>, and <EVIDENCE_PATH>. If sensitive material appears, stop and report only the location and redaction requirement.

Follow least privilege and use the minimum necessary scope. Keep tool and domain allowlists narrow. Do not disable authentication, approvals, sandboxing, endpoint protection, logging, or organizational policy. Do not make changes, run elevated or destructive commands, start listeners, contact third-party systems, or alter production unless a named human owner explicitly approves the exact step.

Require a backup or Git checkpoint before any approved write. Use disposable, non-production fixtures. Capture redacted evidence, classify results as pass, fail, inconclusive, or blocked, define stop conditions, and provide a tested rollback or revert path. A human platform owner and security reviewer must verify the output and approve any implementation.

Task: Prepare a fixture-based validation for Codex 0.158 Mermaid rendering changes using synthetic diagrams with quoted labels and ampersands, without importing confidential architecture.

Authorized inputs:
Synthetic Mermaid fixtures, expected rendering characteristics, approved renderer or preview path, evidence destination, and reviewer names.

Return a concise plan, proposed read-only checks, expected evidence, failure classifications, approval gates, cleanup steps, rollback conditions, and a human sign-off checklist.

Required inputs

Synthetic Mermaid fixtures, expected rendering characteristics, approved renderer or preview path, evidence destination, and reviewer names.

Expected output

A fixture set, comparison table, rendering results, malformed-input behavior, redacted evidence, and rollback or workaround recommendation.

Verification checkpoint

A human reviewer must inspect the rendered diagrams, confirm no confidential labels were used, and reject any claim of universal Mermaid compatibility based on limited fixtures.

Prompts 10–18: MCP OAuth, tool boundaries, Streamable HTTP tokens, and exec-server WebSocket authentication

This section moves from workstation and sandbox validation into the areas that usually create the highest platform risk during a Codex CLI rollout: Model Context Protocol server inventory, OAuth client registration, callback exactness, secret handling, bearer-token protection, and direct exec-server WebSocket authentication. OpenAI’s Codex 0.158 release notes say this version adds support for MCP servers whose OAuth clients use pre-registered secrets through codex mcp add --oauth-client-secret, and support for bearer-token protection for direct exec-server WebSocket connections. Those additions are operationally useful only when a platform team verifies ownership, scopes, storage paths, allowlists, approvals, redaction, and rollback before broad deployment.

The prompts below are written as contracts, not autonomous change tickets. Each prompt tells Codex to start with read-only discovery, avoid secrets in the prompt and generated output, preserve approval gates, and produce evidence a human platform owner can inspect. OpenAI’s MCP documentation states that ChatGPT desktop, Codex CLI, and the IDE extension share MCP configuration for the same Codex host; a configuration mistake can therefore affect more than one user surface. OpenAI’s configuration reference also states that user configuration lives at ~/.codex/config.toml, that project-scoped configuration is loaded only for trusted projects, and that project configuration cannot override machine-local provider, authentication, or telemetry keys. Treat those boundaries as controls to verify, not assumptions to bypass.

This article explains OpenAI Secure MCP Tunnel architecture, authentication boundaries, and how to connect ChatGPT to private MCP servers without exposing them publicly. The OpenAI Secure MCP Tunnel Explained: Connect ChatGPT to Private Servers Without Public Exposure article is a focused companion for MCP OAuth Configuration because although the title is about secure MCP tunneling rather than OAuth specifically, it is the best MCP security/authentication configuration match among the allowed candidates.

Prompt 10: MCP server inventory and ownership map

Purpose

Use this prompt to create a read-only inventory of MCP servers configured for Codex surfaces before enabling, changing, or approving any server. The goal is to identify server names, transport types, configured authentication patterns, enabled tools, disabled tools, ownership, expected data classes, and review gaps without exposing tokens, OAuth client secrets, private endpoints, or user data. This is the first checkpoint because OpenAI’s MCP documentation describes shared configuration across ChatGPT desktop, Codex CLI, and the IDE extension for the same Codex host, so platform teams need a single inventory before making per-surface assumptions.

Copy-paste prompt

You are assisting an authorized platform engineering team with a read-only MCP inventory for Codex 0.158 or later.

Authorization and scope:
- Work only on systems, repositories, workstations, MCP servers, and Codex configurations that I own or am explicitly authorized to administer.
- Do not attempt to access third-party systems, private user workspaces, hidden files outside the approved paths, or production services unless they are listed in the approved inputs.
- Do not bypass authentication, approval prompts, sandboxing, endpoint protection, workspace policy, organizational policy, or third-party terms.

Read-only task:
- Inspect only the approved configuration paths and documentation snippets I provide.
- Build an MCP server inventory that includes server name, transport type, configured auth pattern, expected owner, business purpose, data classes, enabled tools, disabled tools, approval mode if visible, and unresolved questions.
- If a value is unknown, write "unknown" and list the exact evidence needed. Do not infer secrets or private endpoints.

Credential and redaction contract:
- Do not ask me to paste tokens, client secrets, passwords, private keys, cookies, account numbers, personal identifiers, or confidential customer content.
- Redact any credential-like string found in logs or configuration as <REDACTED_SECRET>.
- Redact private hostnames as <PRIVATE_HOST> unless I explicitly say they may be included in the evidence package.
- Use placeholders such as <MCP_SERVER_NAME>, <CLIENT_ID>, <TOKEN_ENV_VAR>, and <APPROVED_CONFIG_PATH>.

Approval and change-control contract:
- Do not modify configuration, install packages, run network probes, approve tools, start servers, stop servers, or change permissions.
- Identify changes that would require human approval, including tool enablement, scope changes, bearer-token configuration, OAuth client registration, and elevated commands.
- Recommend least-privilege allowlists and a staged review plan only after the inventory is complete.

Evidence and rollback contract:
- Produce a table of findings, a separate list of risks, and a list of missing evidence.
- For each recommended follow-up action, specify the pre-change backup or Git checkpoint needed.
- Include rollback notes for each type of proposed change, but do not execute rollback or change steps.

Human verification:
- End with a checklist for a human platform owner to verify server ownership, data classification, OAuth metadata, approval settings, and tool allowlists before any configuration change.

Approved inputs:
- Codex version: <CODEX_VERSION>
- Approved configuration paths: <APPROVED_CONFIG_PATHS>
- Approved host/workspace names: <APPROVED_HOSTS_OR_WORKSPACES>
- Existing MCP documentation excerpts: <PASTE_REDACTED_DOC_EXCERPTS>
- Relevant redacted logs, if any: <PASTE_REDACTED_LOG_EXCERPTS>

Required inputs

• Approved configuration paths, usually including the user-level Codex configuration path and any trusted project configuration files that the platform owner authorizes for review.
• Codex version and rollout ring, because the inventory may support a Codex 0.158-specific validation plan.
• Redacted MCP documentation excerpts, server descriptions, owner records, or internal service catalog entries.
• A policy statement identifying which hosts, workspaces, repositories, or user groups are in scope.

Expected output

The expected output is an inventory table with one row per MCP server and columns for owner, transport, authentication, data classification, tool boundaries, approval status, and evidence gaps. A useful result also separates “observed in configuration” from “asserted by documentation,” because copied snippets, old runbooks, and stale service catalog entries often disagree. The prompt should not return real secrets, unredacted tokens, private customer identifiers, or instructions to access unauthorized servers.

Verification checkpoint

A human platform owner must compare the inventory against the approved service catalog, confirm that each MCP server is owned by an accountable team, verify that each tool has a business purpose, and approve any next-step investigation. No server should move to OAuth registration, bearer-token setup, or per-tool approval review until ownership and data classification are confirmed with evidence.

Prompt 11: Pre-registered OAuth client metadata review

Purpose

Use this prompt to review pre-registered OAuth client metadata for MCP servers before adding or updating Codex MCP configuration. OpenAI’s MCP guide documents a pre-registered OAuth client flow using codex mcp add with a client ID, and Codex 0.158’s release notes add support for --oauth-client-secret. The prompt is designed to inspect metadata and produce a safe implementation plan without pasting or printing the client secret.

Copy-paste prompt

You are assisting an authorized platform team with a pre-registered OAuth client metadata review for an MCP server used with Codex.

Authorization and scope:
- Work only with OAuth clients, MCP servers, repositories, and Codex hosts that I own or am explicitly authorized to administer.
- Do not register, modify, delete, or test OAuth clients unless I separately approve that action after this review.
- Do not bypass identity-provider policy, consent requirements, callback restrictions, device posture checks, tenant policy, approval prompts, sandbox controls, or third-party terms.

Read-only review task:
- Review the redacted OAuth client metadata I provide.
- Identify the client ID placeholder, intended MCP server, allowed callback URLs, grant type or flow description if provided, allowed scopes, token lifetime notes if provided, owner, environment, and rotation contact.
- Check whether the metadata is complete enough to support a Codex MCP add/update plan using placeholders only.
- Identify conflicts between development, staging, and production metadata.

Credential and redaction contract:
- Do not ask for or output the OAuth client secret.
- Refer to the secret only as an environment variable name such as <MCP_OAUTH_CLIENT_SECRET_ENV_VAR>.
- Redact tokens, secrets, authorization codes, refresh tokens, cookies, private hostnames, user identifiers, and tenant identifiers unless explicitly approved for inclusion.
- Do not place secrets in shell commands, TOML examples, issue comments, commit messages, or evidence reports.

Approval and change-control contract:
- Do not run codex mcp add, edit config files, approve MCP tools, or initiate an OAuth login.
- Mark every proposed command as "requires human approval before execution."
- Require a backup or Git checkpoint for any repository-scoped configuration change and a config backup for user-level configuration changes.

Evidence and rollback contract:
- Produce a metadata completeness table, a risk list, and a change-readiness verdict of "ready", "blocked", or "needs owner review".
- Include evidence needed for callback verification, scope review, secret storage, approval settings, and rollback.
- Describe rollback as restoring the previous configuration and disabling the unapproved client if an authorized owner decides to do so; do not execute rollback.

Human verification:
- End with a sign-off checklist requiring the identity owner, MCP server owner, security reviewer, and platform owner to verify metadata before any client secret is used.

Approved inputs:
- MCP server name: <MCP_SERVER_NAME>
- Environment: <DEV_STAGING_OR_PROD>
- Redacted OAuth metadata: <PASTE_REDACTED_METADATA>
- Approved callback URL list: <PASTE_APPROVED_CALLBACK_URLS_WITHOUT_SECRETS>
- Approved scope list: <PASTE_APPROVED_SCOPES>
- Secret environment-variable name only: <MCP_OAUTH_CLIENT_SECRET_ENV_VAR>

Required inputs

• Redacted OAuth application metadata from the identity system or owner-approved registration record.
• The intended MCP server name and environment, because callback URLs and scopes should not be mixed across development, staging, and production.
• The environment-variable name that will hold the client secret, not the secret value.
• Approved scope and callback lists supplied by the service owner or identity administrator.

Expected output

The expected output is a readiness assessment that states whether the metadata is complete, blocked, or awaiting owner review. It should call out missing callback URLs, overly broad scopes, unclear ownership, environment mixing, absent rotation contact, and absent evidence for secret storage. Any sample command must use placeholders and be labeled as a plan requiring human approval, not as an instruction that Codex should run automatically.

Verification checkpoint

A human identity owner and MCP server owner must verify that the client ID belongs to the intended application, that the secret is stored outside prompts and repositories, that callback URLs match the official Codex MCP requirements, and that the scope list is appropriate for the server’s purpose. No one should paste a real client secret into Codex, chat, a ticket, or a generated report.

Prompt 12: Exact MCP OAuth callback verification

Purpose

Use this prompt when a pre-registered OAuth client fails authorization or when the platform team needs proof that callback registration is exact before rollout. OpenAI’s MCP documentation requires exact callback registration for OAuth flows. This prompt asks Codex to compare approved callback strings supplied by the owner against configured metadata, without logging in, opening a browser, capturing authorization codes, or modifying the OAuth client.

Copy-paste prompt

You are assisting an authorized platform owner with exact MCP OAuth callback verification.

Authorization and scope:
- Work only on OAuth metadata and MCP configuration that I own or am explicitly authorized to administer.
- Do not perform login attempts, consent flows, token exchanges, browser automation, or network calls unless separately approved after this read-only comparison.
- Do not bypass callback validation, identity-provider controls, tenant restrictions, approval prompts, sandboxing, or organizational policy.

Read-only comparison task:
- Compare the approved callback URLs against the registered callback URLs exactly as strings.
- Check scheme, host, port, path, trailing slash, case sensitivity where relevant, query string presence, environment naming, and accidental whitespace.
- Identify whether each required callback is present, missing, mismatched, duplicated, or environment-confused.
- Do not normalize differences away unless you clearly label the normalization as a diagnostic observation rather than a pass.

Credential and redaction contract:
- Do not ask for or output client secrets, authorization codes, access tokens, refresh tokens, cookies, user identifiers, or tenant-sensitive values.
- Redact private hostnames as <PRIVATE_HOST> if the approved evidence package requires redaction.
- Use placeholders for client IDs and callback URLs if the report will leave the platform team.

Approval and change-control contract:
- Do not edit OAuth client registration, Codex config, MCP server config, DNS, reverse proxies, or firewall rules.
- Any proposed metadata correction must be marked "requires identity-owner approval and change ticket."
- Require a rollback plan for callback edits because changing callbacks can break existing clients.

Evidence and rollback contract:
- Produce a side-by-side callback comparison table.
- Include a failure taxonomy: missing callback, extra callback, wrong environment, scheme mismatch, host mismatch, port mismatch, path mismatch, trailing-slash mismatch, query mismatch, whitespace, or unknown.
- Include evidence references using redacted source labels, not secrets.
- State how to restore the previous callback set if an approved change causes failure, but do not execute the change.

Human verification:
- End with a checklist requiring a human identity owner and platform owner to verify exact callback strings in the identity provider and Codex MCP documentation before approving changes.

Approved inputs:
- MCP server name: <MCP_SERVER_NAME>
- Environment: <DEV_STAGING_OR_PROD>
- Approved callback URLs: <PASTE_APPROVED_CALLBACK_URLS>
- Registered callback URLs from OAuth client metadata: <PASTE_REGISTERED_CALLBACK_URLS>
- Redaction requirement: <STATE_WHETHER_PRIVATE_HOSTS_MUST_BE_REDACTED>

Required inputs

• The owner-approved callback URLs copied from the platform’s expected configuration source.
• The registered callback URLs copied from the OAuth client metadata, with secrets and irrelevant tenant details removed.
• The target environment so that staging callbacks are not accidentally validated as production callbacks.
• A redaction instruction for private hostnames if the report will be shared beyond the administrator group.

Expected output

The expected output is a side-by-side comparison table that treats minor-looking differences as operationally significant until an identity owner confirms otherwise. A callback with the wrong scheme, host, port, path, trailing slash, query string, or environment should be marked as a mismatch rather than silently normalized. The report should propose precise corrections but must not update the identity provider, run OAuth flows, or capture authorization artifacts.

Verification checkpoint

A human identity owner must verify the exact callback list directly in the identity-provider console or approved configuration system, and a human platform owner must confirm that the intended Codex MCP flow uses those callbacks. The correction should be executed only through the organization’s change process, with a record of the previous callback set for rollback.

Prompt 13: OAuth client-secret handling by environment variable

Purpose

Use this prompt to create a secret-safe implementation plan for Codex 0.158’s support for MCP OAuth clients that use pre-registered secrets. The release notes identify codex mcp add --oauth-client-secret support, but the safe pattern for an organization is to treat the actual value as a managed secret and reference only an approved environment-variable name in prompts, tickets, and generated artifacts. This prompt prevents secrets from being copied into shell history, repositories, logs, screenshots, or Codex responses.

Copy-paste prompt

You are assisting an authorized platform team with a secret-safe plan for an MCP OAuth client secret used with Codex 0.158 or later.

Authorization and scope:
- Work only on MCP servers, OAuth clients, developer workstations, CI systems, and configuration files that I own or am explicitly authorized to administer.
- Follow least privilege: begin read-only, keep scope narrow, and use only the minimum necessary paths, tools, and environment-variable references.
- Do not retrieve, print, test, rotate, or transmit any real secret unless a separate approved change procedure outside this prompt authorizes it.
- Do not bypass secret-management policy, endpoint controls, shell-history protections, approval prompts, sandboxing, or organizational policy.

Planning task:
- Produce a plan that uses only the environment-variable name <MCP_OAUTH_CLIENT_SECRET_ENV_VAR> and never the secret value.
- Identify safe storage locations by category, such as approved OS secret store, approved enterprise secret manager, or approved runtime environment variable injection, without inventing product-specific behavior.
- Identify unsafe locations, including prompts, generated output, shell history, repositories, issue trackers, shared docs, screenshots, unredacted logs, terminal transcripts, and config examples containing real values.
- Draft placeholder-only command examples and label them as requiring human approval before execution.

Credential and redaction contract:
- Do not ask me to paste the client secret.
- If any input includes a credential-like value, replace it with <REDACTED_SECRET> and warn that the source artifact may need incident review.
- Use placeholders for client ID, server name, config path, callback URL, and token values.
- Do not include real hostnames or usernames unless I explicitly authorize them for the evidence package.

Approval and change-control contract:
- Do not run commands, edit files, export variables, approve tools, or validate logins.
- Require a Git checkpoint or config backup before configuration changes.
- Require human approval before any command that adds or updates an MCP server, changes OAuth metadata, stores a secret, or changes tool permissions.

Evidence and rollback contract:
- Produce a secret-handling checklist, a placeholder-only implementation plan, a redaction plan, and a rollback plan.
- The rollback plan must cover removing the new configuration reference, restoring the previous config backup, and requesting secret revocation or rotation through the approved owner if exposure is suspected.
- Do not claim that redaction proves a secret was never exposed.

Human verification:
- End with a checklist requiring the platform owner, security owner, and identity owner to verify the environment-variable name, storage mechanism, execution procedure, and evidence package before use.

Approved inputs:
- MCP server name: <MCP_SERVER_NAME>
- OAuth client ID placeholder: <CLIENT_ID>
- Secret environment-variable name only: <MCP_OAUTH_CLIENT_SECRET_ENV_VAR>
- Approved config path: <APPROVED_CONFIG_PATH>
- Approved secret-storage policy excerpt: <PASTE_REDACTED_POLICY_EXCERPT>
- Intended environment: <DEV_STAGING_OR_PROD>

Required inputs

• The environment-variable name that will carry the client secret at runtime.
• The MCP server name, OAuth client ID placeholder, and intended environment.
• A redacted secret-storage policy excerpt that defines where secrets may be stored and how they may be injected.
• The approved configuration path or host class where the MCP setup will be applied.

Expected output

The output should be a secret-handling plan with placeholder-only examples. It should list unsafe exposure channels, define a redaction procedure for evidence, and require separate owner approval before anyone executes a command that references the secret environment variable. The generated plan should not include the real secret, should not recommend hard-coding the value, and should not claim that an environment variable alone is sufficient security without storage, access, logging, and rotation controls.

Verification checkpoint

A human security owner must confirm that the secret-storage mechanism complies with local policy, and a platform owner must verify that command examples contain only placeholders or environment-variable names. If a real secret appears in the conversation, logs, command history, screenshots, or generated files, the team should treat that as a potential credential exposure and follow its incident process.

Prompt 14: MCP OAuth scope review and least-privilege recommendation

Purpose

Use this prompt to evaluate whether requested OAuth scopes are appropriate for the MCP server’s intended use. Scope review is separate from callback verification and secret handling: an exact callback and safely stored secret can still produce excessive access if scopes are too broad. OpenAI’s MCP documentation covers OAuth support, but each organization must decide which scopes are justified for its own servers, data classes, and user populations.

Copy-paste prompt

You are assisting an authorized platform and security team with an MCP OAuth scope review.

Authorization and scope:
- Work only with MCP servers, OAuth clients, data classifications, and policy excerpts that I own or am explicitly authorized to review.
- Do not request access to protected data, perform live authorization, test tokens, or change scopes.
- Do not bypass identity policy, consent requirements, approval workflows, sandboxing, data-loss-prevention controls, or third-party terms.

Review task:
- Compare each requested OAuth scope to the MCP server purpose, enabled tools, expected users, data classes, and approved operational workflows.
- Classify each scope as "required", "possibly required", "too broad", "unclear", or "not justified from supplied evidence".
- Recommend the narrowest scope set supported by the supplied evidence.
- Identify scopes that require legal, privacy, security, or data-owner review before use.

Credential and redaction contract:
- Do not ask for or output tokens, secrets, authorization codes, refresh tokens, cookies, user identifiers, account identifiers, or confidential records.
- Redact sensitive system names and data-source names if I mark them as confidential.
- Use placeholders for client IDs, tenant names, servers, repositories, and internal policy IDs.

Approval and change-control contract:
- Do not update OAuth scopes, MCP configuration, enabled tools, or approval settings.
- Mark every proposed scope change as requiring identity-owner and data-owner approval.
- Require a pre-change metadata export or documented previous-scope list for rollback.

Evidence and rollback contract:
- Produce a scope review table with evidence citations to the supplied redacted inputs.
- Include a least-privilege recommendation, residual risks, unanswered questions, and rollback considerations.
- Do not claim a scope is safe solely because it is documented or commonly used.

Human verification:
- End with a checklist requiring platform, security, identity, privacy, and data-owner review for scopes that grant broad read/write access or access to regulated data.

Approved inputs:
- MCP server purpose: <MCP_SERVER_PURPOSE>
- Requested scopes: <PASTE_REQUESTED_SCOPES>
- Enabled tools or proposed tools: <PASTE_TOOL_LIST>
- Data classes involved: <PASTE_DATA_CLASSIFICATION>
- Redacted policy excerpts: <PASTE_REDACTED_POLICY_EXCERPTS>
- Environment: <DEV_STAGING_OR_PROD>

Required inputs

• The requested scope list exactly as proposed, with no tokens or secrets.
• The MCP server purpose and the tool list that those scopes are supposed to support.
• Data classification information, because access to source code, production logs, employee data, customer records, or regulated content may require different review paths.
• Redacted policy excerpts from security, privacy, identity, or data-governance standards.

Expected output

The expected output is a table that maps each scope to a business purpose, supported tool, data class, and reviewer requirement. The recommendation should favor the narrowest functional scope set and identify where the evidence does not justify access. It should not approve the scopes itself, perform live OAuth testing, or claim that least privilege has been achieved until the responsible owners sign off.

Verification checkpoint

Human reviewers must validate that every retained scope is necessary, approved by the appropriate data owner, and consistent with the MCP server’s enabled tools. Any scope that enables write access, broad read access, external transmission, or access to sensitive data should receive explicit documented approval before rollout.

Prompt 15: MCP tool allowlist and denylist design

Purpose

Use this prompt to design narrow MCP tool allowlists and denylist recommendations based on the server’s purpose and approval model. OpenAI’s MCP documentation describes enabled and disabled tool lists, along with server and per-tool approval modes. The operational risk is that a broadly authenticated server may expose tools that are unnecessary for a workflow, increasing the chance of accidental data access, external side effects, or approval fatigue.

Copy-paste prompt

You are assisting an authorized platform team with MCP tool allowlist and denylist design for Codex.

Authorization and scope:
- Work only with MCP servers, tool descriptions, repositories, workspaces, and policies that I own or am explicitly authorized to administer.
- Do not enable, disable, invoke, approve, or test any MCP tool during this design task.
- Do not bypass authentication, tool approval, sandboxing, workspace policy, network boundaries, or third-party terms.

Design task:
- Review the supplied MCP server purpose, tool descriptions, data classes, and intended user workflows.
- Recommend a minimal enabled-tool allowlist and a disabled-tool denylist.
- Identify tools that should remain unavailable until further security, privacy, legal, or data-owner review.
- Separate read-only tools, write-capable tools, external-action tools, destructive tools, permission-changing tools, and unclear tools.

Credential and redaction contract:
- Do not ask for or output credentials, tokens, client secrets, private keys, cookies, personal data, customer records, proprietary source snippets, or confidential logs.
- Redact sensitive tool arguments, private hostnames, repository names, and data-source names if required by the supplied redaction policy.
- Use placeholders for server names, repositories, hosts, data sources, and issue IDs.

Approval and change-control contract:
- Do not edit Codex configuration, MCP configuration, tool lists, or approval settings.
- Mark every proposed allowlist or denylist change as requiring human platform-owner approval.
- Require a backup or Git checkpoint before any configuration change and an approval record for write-capable, destructive, or external-action tools.

Evidence and rollback contract:
- Produce a tool classification table, a proposed allowlist, a proposed denylist, a per-tool approval recommendation, and a rollback note.
- Include evidence references from supplied documentation rather than unsupported assumptions.
- Rollback must include restoring the previous tool list and reviewing any actions taken while a tool was enabled.

Human verification:
- End with a checklist requiring a human platform owner, security reviewer, and data owner to verify that enabled tools match the approved workflow and that risky tools remain disabled or approval-gated.

Approved inputs:
- MCP server name: <MCP_SERVER_NAME>
- Tool list and descriptions: <PASTE_TOOL_LIST_AND_DESCRIPTIONS>
- Intended workflows: <PASTE_WORKFLOW_DESCRIPTIONS>
- Data classification: <PASTE_DATA_CLASSIFICATION>
- Redacted policy excerpts: <PASTE_REDACTED_POLICY_EXCERPTS>
- Current enabled/disabled tool lists, if any: <PASTE_REDACTED_CURRENT_TOOL_CONFIG>

Required inputs

• A list of tools exposed by the MCP server, with owner-approved descriptions of each tool’s behavior.
• The intended workflows and user groups that will use those tools.
• Data classification and redacted policy excerpts defining restrictions on write actions, external transmissions, and sensitive data access.
• Current enabled and disabled tool lists, if already configured.

Expected output

The output should classify each tool by risk and recommend a minimal allowlist. It should distinguish read-only discovery from write-capable actions, destructive actions, permission changes, external submissions, and tools whose behavior is unclear. A strong response will recommend disabling unclear or high-impact tools until documentation, test fixtures, and approval policy are available.

Verification checkpoint

A human platform owner must verify that every enabled tool maps to an approved workflow, and a security or data owner must verify that tools with write, destructive, permission-changing, or external-action capability remain disabled or approval-gated. Tool configuration should not be changed until the previous configuration is backed up and the rollback path is documented.

Prompt 16: Review per-tool MCP approval policy

Purpose

Review a redacted MCP tool inventory and propose least-privilege server and per-tool approval modes without changing configuration.

Copy-paste prompt

You are assisting an authorized platform-engineering team with Codex CLI 0.158 on systems I own or am explicitly authorized to administer. Begin with read-only discovery. Work only within the named hosts, repositories, paths, MCP servers, and test environments.

Never request, reveal, copy, store, or print real credentials, OAuth client secrets, bearer tokens, API keys, private keys, personal data, or confidential content. Use placeholders or approved environment-variable names only, including <HOSTNAME>, <REPOSITORY_PATH>, <MCP_SERVER_NAME>, <OAUTH_CLIENT_ID>, <OAUTH_CLIENT_SECRET_ENV_VAR>, <BEARER_TOKEN_ENV_VAR>, and <EVIDENCE_PATH>. If sensitive material appears, stop and report only the location and redaction requirement.

Follow least privilege and use the minimum necessary scope. Keep tool and domain allowlists narrow. Do not disable authentication, approvals, sandboxing, endpoint protection, logging, or organizational policy. Do not make changes, run elevated or destructive commands, start listeners, contact third-party systems, or alter production unless a named human owner explicitly approves the exact step.

Require a backup or Git checkpoint before any approved write. Use disposable, non-production fixtures. Capture redacted evidence, classify results as pass, fail, inconclusive, or blocked, define stop conditions, and provide a tested rollback or revert path. A human platform owner and security reviewer must verify the output and approve any implementation.

Task: Review a redacted MCP tool inventory and propose least-privilege server and per-tool approval modes without changing configuration.

Authorized inputs:
MCP server name, redacted tool descriptions, intended workflows, data classification, current approval modes, and policy owner.

Return a concise plan, proposed read-only checks, expected evidence, failure classifications, approval gates, cleanup steps, rollback conditions, and a human sign-off checklist.

Required inputs

MCP server name, redacted tool descriptions, intended workflows, data classification, current approval modes, and policy owner.

Expected output

A tool-by-tool risk table, minimal allowlist, proposed approval modes, blocked unknowns, test fixtures, and rollback notes.

Verification checkpoint

The platform, security, and data owners must verify every enabled tool maps to an approved workflow and approve any change.

Prompt 17: Validate Streamable HTTP bearer-token handling

Purpose

Design negative and positive tests for an authorized Streamable HTTP MCP server that uses a bearer token supplied through an approved environment-variable reference.

Copy-paste prompt

You are assisting an authorized platform-engineering team with Codex CLI 0.158 on systems I own or am explicitly authorized to administer. Begin with read-only discovery. Work only within the named hosts, repositories, paths, MCP servers, and test environments.

Never request, reveal, copy, store, or print real credentials, OAuth client secrets, bearer tokens, API keys, private keys, personal data, or confidential content. Use placeholders or approved environment-variable names only, including <HOSTNAME>, <REPOSITORY_PATH>, <MCP_SERVER_NAME>, <OAUTH_CLIENT_ID>, <OAUTH_CLIENT_SECRET_ENV_VAR>, <BEARER_TOKEN_ENV_VAR>, and <EVIDENCE_PATH>. If sensitive material appears, stop and report only the location and redaction requirement.

Follow least privilege and use the minimum necessary scope. Keep tool and domain allowlists narrow. Do not disable authentication, approvals, sandboxing, endpoint protection, logging, or organizational policy. Do not make changes, run elevated or destructive commands, start listeners, contact third-party systems, or alter production unless a named human owner explicitly approves the exact step.

Require a backup or Git checkpoint before any approved write. Use disposable, non-production fixtures. Capture redacted evidence, classify results as pass, fail, inconclusive, or blocked, define stop conditions, and provide a tested rollback or revert path. A human platform owner and security reviewer must verify the output and approve any implementation.

Task: Design negative and positive tests for an authorized Streamable HTTP MCP server that uses a bearer token supplied through an approved environment-variable reference.

Authorized inputs:
Authorized staging MCP URL, bearer-token environment-variable name without its value, expected scopes, test client, evidence path, and incident contact.

Return a concise plan, proposed read-only checks, expected evidence, failure classifications, approval gates, cleanup steps, rollback conditions, and a human sign-off checklist.

Required inputs

Authorized staging MCP URL, bearer-token environment-variable name without its value, expected scopes, test client, evidence path, and incident contact.

Expected output

A test matrix for valid, absent, malformed, expired, and wrong-scope tokens; expected status behavior; redacted evidence; cleanup; and rollback.

Verification checkpoint

A security reviewer must confirm that no token value appears in prompts, shell history, logs, screenshots, or evidence, and that unauthorized requests fail closed.

Prompt 18: Protect direct exec-server WebSocket connections

Purpose

Create a controlled validation plan for Codex 0.158 bearer-token protection on direct exec-server WebSocket connections using a non-production endpoint.

Copy-paste prompt

You are assisting an authorized platform-engineering team with Codex CLI 0.158 on systems I own or am explicitly authorized to administer. Begin with read-only discovery. Work only within the named hosts, repositories, paths, MCP servers, and test environments.

Never request, reveal, copy, store, or print real credentials, OAuth client secrets, bearer tokens, API keys, private keys, personal data, or confidential content. Use placeholders or approved environment-variable names only, including <HOSTNAME>, <REPOSITORY_PATH>, <MCP_SERVER_NAME>, <OAUTH_CLIENT_ID>, <OAUTH_CLIENT_SECRET_ENV_VAR>, <BEARER_TOKEN_ENV_VAR>, and <EVIDENCE_PATH>. If sensitive material appears, stop and report only the location and redaction requirement.

Follow least privilege and use the minimum necessary scope. Keep tool and domain allowlists narrow. Do not disable authentication, approvals, sandboxing, endpoint protection, logging, or organizational policy. Do not make changes, run elevated or destructive commands, start listeners, contact third-party systems, or alter production unless a named human owner explicitly approves the exact step.

Require a backup or Git checkpoint before any approved write. Use disposable, non-production fixtures. Capture redacted evidence, classify results as pass, fail, inconclusive, or blocked, define stop conditions, and provide a tested rollback or revert path. A human platform owner and security reviewer must verify the output and approve any implementation.

Task: Create a controlled validation plan for Codex 0.158 bearer-token protection on direct exec-server WebSocket connections using a non-production endpoint.

Authorized inputs:
Authorized staging WebSocket endpoint, token environment-variable name, client identity, network allowlist, expected authentication failures, and rollback owner.

Return a concise plan, proposed read-only checks, expected evidence, failure classifications, approval gates, cleanup steps, rollback conditions, and a human sign-off checklist.

Required inputs

Authorized staging WebSocket endpoint, token environment-variable name, client identity, network allowlist, expected authentication failures, and rollback owner.

Expected output

A handshake and authorization test matrix, valid and invalid token cases, network-boundary checks, redacted event evidence, stop conditions, and rollback steps.

Verification checkpoint

A human platform and security owner must verify that unauthenticated, malformed, expired, and wrong-token connections are rejected and that the listener is not exposed beyond the approved network scope.

Prompt 19: Elevated terminal approval test plan

Purpose

Use this prompt to design a controlled validation of Codex 0.158’s elevated terminal approval behavior without encouraging unsafe shell execution. OpenAI’s 0.158 release notes state that terminal input approval is enabled by default for elevated-permission commands, and the security guidance on agent approvals reinforces that human review remains part of safe Codex operation. This prompt treats the feature as an approval-control surface to test, not as permission to run privileged commands freely.

Copy-paste prompt

You are assisting an authorized platform engineering team. Scope this work only to systems, repositories, sandboxes, and developer workstations that we own or are explicitly authorized to administer.

Safety contract: Do not ask for, reveal, store, or reproduce credentials, bearer tokens, OAuth client secrets, private keys, personal identifiers, privileged customer data, proprietary source beyond the provided placeholders, or confidential logs. Use placeholders such as <WORKSTATION_ID>, <REPO_PATH>, <SANDBOX_PROFILE>, <TEST_COMMAND_PLACEHOLDER>, and <EVIDENCE_PATH>. Start with read-only discovery. Apply least privilege, narrow tool and domain allowlists, explicit approval before elevated or destructive actions, backups or Git checkpoints, representative test fixtures, redaction, evidence capture, and rollback. Never bypass authentication, approval prompts, sandboxing, endpoint protection, organizational policy, or third-party terms. A human platform owner must verify recommendations and approve every change.

Task: Create a test plan for elevated terminal approval behavior in Codex 0.158. The plan must avoid running real privileged commands in production. Use harmless placeholder commands or approved non-production fixtures that simulate elevated intent. Include:
1. Preconditions for a trusted test repository and non-production workstation.
2. A Git checkpoint or backup requirement before any interactive session.
3. A matrix of command categories that should require human approval, such as package installation, permission changes, service management, privileged file writes, and network-affecting actions.
4. A separate category of commands that must be rejected rather than approved.
5. Expected user-review questions before approval.
6. Evidence to capture without copying secrets or private logs.
7. Rollback and stop criteria.
8. A final sign-off checklist for the human platform owner.

Required inputs

• <WORKSTATION_ID> or anonymized host label.
• <REPO_PATH> for a non-production repository or test fixture.
• <SANDBOX_PROFILE> and the relevant approval policy name, if known.
• A list of prohibited actions defined by the organization, such as destructive file removal, firewall changes, production database access, or credential export.
• An evidence directory placeholder, never a real secret store or sensitive log path.

Expected output

The expected output is a table-driven approval test plan that separates read-only checks, approval-required scenarios, reject-only scenarios, evidence artifacts, reviewer questions, rollback actions, and final sign-off. It should explicitly say that approving a command only authorizes the specific reviewed action in the current context and does not create blanket permission for future elevated operations.

Verification checkpoint

Before running any test, confirm that a human platform owner has approved the fixture, the workstation is not production-critical, the command examples are harmless or simulated, and no credentials appear in the prompt, transcript, or output. Treat any suggestion to disable approvals, weaken endpoint controls, or run privileged commands without review as a failed result.

Prompt 20: Runtime-only grant regression review

Purpose

Use this prompt to verify that runtime-only grants do not create unnecessary repeat reviews while still preserving approval boundaries. OpenAI’s 0.158 release notes say runtime-only grants should no longer trigger unnecessary repeat reviews. That is a usability and correctness fix, not a reason to expand access, skip approvals, or treat a temporary grant as a persistent authorization.

Copy-paste prompt

You are assisting an authorized platform engineering team. Scope this work only to systems, repositories, sandboxes, and developer workstations that we own or are explicitly authorized to administer.

Safety contract: Do not ask for, reveal, store, or reproduce credentials, bearer tokens, OAuth client secrets, private keys, personal identifiers, privileged customer data, proprietary source beyond the provided placeholders, or confidential logs. Use placeholders such as <GRANT_TYPE>, <SESSION_ID>, <TOOL_NAME>, <RESOURCE_SCOPE>, and <REDACTED_TRANSCRIPT_PATH>. Start with read-only discovery. Apply least privilege, narrow tool and domain allowlists, explicit approval before elevated or destructive actions, backups or Git checkpoints, representative test fixtures, redaction, evidence capture, and rollback. Never bypass authentication, approval prompts, sandboxing, endpoint protection, organizational policy, or third-party terms. A human platform owner must verify recommendations and approve every change.

Task: Build a runtime-only grant regression checklist for Codex 0.158. We want to confirm that a temporary session grant behaves as temporary, does not require unnecessary repeated review for the same approved runtime action, and does not persist beyond its intended boundary.

Include:
1. Definitions for runtime-only grant, persistent configuration, session boundary, tool boundary, and resource boundary.
2. A safe test fixture using placeholder tools and non-sensitive resources.
3. Steps to observe first approval, subsequent same-session behavior, and behavior after session reset or workspace change.
4. Checks that the grant does not expand to other tools, paths, hosts, or secrets.
5. Evidence to capture in redacted transcripts.
6. Failure conditions that require rollback or escalation.
7. A sign-off form for the human owner.

Required inputs

• <GRANT_TYPE>, such as temporary tool access, temporary path access, or temporary runtime permission.
• <TOOL_NAME> for the placeholder or non-production tool under test.
• <RESOURCE_SCOPE>, expressed narrowly, such as a test directory or fixture service.
• <SESSION_ID> or other non-sensitive session label for evidence correlation.
• Local workspace policy constraints that govern approvals and sandbox access.

Expected output

The output should be a regression checklist with clear pass, warn, and fail criteria. A pass means the grant reduces duplicate review only within the approved runtime context. A fail means the grant persists unexpectedly, applies to new resources, hides approval events, or allows activity that was not explicitly approved.

Verification checkpoint

Review the redacted transcript and local configuration after the test. If the output suggests changing project configuration to override machine-local security controls, or if it treats temporary authorization as durable access, stop the rollout and escalate to the platform owner.

Prompt 21: Approval retry after new user input

Purpose

Use this prompt to test the Codex 0.158 fix for approval reviews interrupted by new user input. The release notes identify this as a repaired behavior, so the practical engineering question is whether your local workflow still preserves the correct action, context, and reviewer decision when a user adds clarification during a pending approval.

Copy-paste prompt

You are assisting an authorized platform engineering team. Scope this work only to systems, repositories, sandboxes, and developer workstations that we own or are explicitly authorized to administer.

Safety contract: Do not ask for, reveal, store, or reproduce credentials, bearer tokens, OAuth client secrets, private keys, personal identifiers, privileged customer data, proprietary source beyond the provided placeholders, or confidential logs. Use placeholders such as <PENDING_ACTION>, <USER_CLARIFICATION>, <APPROVAL_EVENT_ID>, <REPO_PATH>, and <REDACTED_EVIDENCE_PATH>. Start with read-only discovery. Apply least privilege, narrow tool and domain allowlists, explicit approval before elevated or destructive actions, backups or Git checkpoints, representative test fixtures, redaction, evidence capture, and rollback. Never bypass authentication, approval prompts, sandboxing, endpoint protection, organizational policy, or third-party terms. A human platform owner must verify recommendations and approve every change.

Task: Design an approval-interruption validation for Codex 0.158. The scenario is that Codex requests approval for a non-production, harmless action, then the user provides additional input before the approval review completes.

Produce:
1. A safe scenario using placeholders, not real privileged commands.
2. Preconditions, including Git checkpoint or backup.
3. The exact observations to capture: pending action text, new user input, whether the approval request remains accurate, whether the reviewed action changes, and whether a retry is needed.
4. Decision rules for approve, deny, retry, or abandon.
5. Transcript-redaction instructions.
6. Rollback and escalation criteria if the approval request becomes stale, ambiguous, or mismatched.

Required inputs

• <PENDING_ACTION>, described as a harmless test action rather than a real destructive command.
• <USER_CLARIFICATION>, such as a changed target path in a fixture repository.
• <REPO_PATH> for a repository that already has a checkpoint.
• <APPROVAL_EVENT_ID> or an anonymized evidence label.
• Reviewer policy for when changed context requires a new approval request.

Expected output

The expected output is a validation script in prose, not executable automation, that makes stale approval requests visible. It should recommend denial or retry whenever the pending action no longer matches the user’s latest instruction, the target path changes, the command semantics change, or the evidence cannot prove what was approved.

Verification checkpoint

This article describes a Codex signal-to-pull-request workflow where Codex monitors integration opportunities, gathers context, creates pull requests, runs tests, and relies on human review before shipping or outreach. The How to Build a Codex Signal-to-Pull-Request Workflow: From Integration Opportunity to Tested Code and Human Review article is a focused companion for Human Review for Platform Changes because it directly connects Codex-driven platform or integration changes with tested code and human review gates, matching the marker’s review-for-change context.

Prompt 22: Command completion and launch-failure event evidence

Purpose

Use this prompt to inspect command completion events, early output capture, and launch-failure evidence after upgrading to Codex 0.158. OpenAI’s release notes say the version fixes command completion events that lacked early output or launch-failure detail. A platform team should validate that observability and incident records now contain enough information to diagnose failures without exposing secrets.

Copy-paste prompt

You are assisting an authorized platform engineering team. Scope this work only to systems, repositories, sandboxes, and developer workstations that we own or are explicitly authorized to administer.

Safety contract: Do not ask for, reveal, store, or reproduce credentials, bearer tokens, OAuth client secrets, private keys, personal identifiers, privileged customer data, proprietary source beyond the provided placeholders, or confidential logs. Use placeholders such as <COMMAND_FIXTURE>, <EXPECTED_EXIT_STATUS>, <LAUNCH_FAILURE_FIXTURE>, <LOG_SOURCE>, and <REDACTED_EVENT_SAMPLE>. Start with read-only discovery. Apply least privilege, narrow tool and domain allowlists, explicit approval before elevated or destructive actions, backups or Git checkpoints, representative test fixtures, redaction, evidence capture, and rollback. Never bypass authentication, approval prompts, sandboxing, endpoint protection, organizational policy, or third-party terms. A human platform owner must verify recommendations and approve every change.

Task: Create a validation plan for Codex 0.158 command completion and launch-failure events.

Include:
1. A safe successful command fixture that emits early output and exits normally.
2. A safe failing command fixture that exits with a controlled nonzero status.
3. A safe launch-failure fixture, such as a deliberately missing executable name represented by a placeholder.
4. Required evidence fields: command category, start time, early output presence, exit status or launch-failure reason, redaction status, and reviewer notes.
5. Secret-redaction rules for command output and logs.
6. Pass/fail criteria for event completeness.
7. A rollback or block recommendation if completion events remain ambiguous.

Required inputs

• <COMMAND_FIXTURE> for a harmless command that prints non-sensitive text.
• <EXPECTED_EXIT_STATUS> for success and controlled failure cases.
• <LAUNCH_FAILURE_FIXTURE> represented as a placeholder, not a command that damages the environment.
• <LOG_SOURCE>, such as a local transcript, terminal event record, or approved telemetry view.
• Organizational redaction rules for paths, usernames, hostnames, and internal service names.

Expected output

The output should be an evidence matrix that distinguishes normal completion, nonzero exit, launch failure, and missing event detail. It should recommend blocking wider rollout if launch failures cannot be distinguished from successful completion, if early output is lost when needed for diagnosis, or if logs capture unredacted secrets.

Verification checkpoint

Confirm that the evidence proves what happened without requiring readers to inspect raw sensitive logs. The reviewer should be able to answer whether a command started, whether it emitted early output, whether it completed, why it failed to launch, and whether any remediation is needed.

Prompt 23: Transcript copy/paste and Markdown preservation validation

Purpose

Use this prompt to validate transcript copy behavior after the Codex 0.158 fullscreen TUI changes. OpenAI’s release notes state that the version adds configurable copy-on-select and right-click paste, and preserves Markdown when copying transcripts. For platform teams, the risk is not only broken formatting; it is accidental copying of secrets, private logs, or unsupported evidence into tickets and release records.

Copy-paste prompt

You are assisting an authorized platform engineering team. Scope this work only to systems, repositories, sandboxes, and developer workstations that we own or are explicitly authorized to administer.

Safety contract: Do not ask for, reveal, store, or reproduce credentials, bearer tokens, OAuth client secrets, private keys, personal identifiers, privileged customer data, proprietary source beyond the provided placeholders, or confidential logs. Use placeholders such as <TRANSCRIPT_FIXTURE>, <MARKDOWN_TABLE_FIXTURE>, <REDACTION_RULESET>, <DESTINATION_SYSTEM>, and <EVIDENCE_RECORD>. Start with read-only discovery. Apply least privilege, narrow tool and domain allowlists, explicit approval before elevated or destructive actions, backups or Git checkpoints, representative test fixtures, redaction, evidence capture, and rollback. Never bypass authentication, approval prompts, sandboxing, endpoint protection, organizational policy, or third-party terms. A human platform owner must verify recommendations and approve every change.

Task: Produce a transcript copy/paste validation checklist for Codex 0.158.

Test:
1. Copying a transcript section containing headings, bullet lists, code blocks, and a Markdown table using non-sensitive fixture content.
2. Whether Markdown structure is preserved when pasted into an approved destination.
3. Whether copy-on-select and right-click paste behavior matches local policy and user expectations.
4. Whether redaction is performed before pasting into tickets, release notes, chat, documentation, or audit systems.
5. Whether copied evidence includes enough context but excludes secrets, tokens, internal hostnames if restricted, personal data, and confidential logs.
6. Whether a reviewer can reproduce the validation without relying on private content.

Required inputs

• <TRANSCRIPT_FIXTURE> containing only synthetic or approved non-sensitive content.
• <MARKDOWN_TABLE_FIXTURE> for formatting validation.
• <REDACTION_RULESET> describing what must be removed before sharing.
• <DESTINATION_SYSTEM>, such as an approved internal ticketing or release-evidence system.
• Local policy on clipboard use, screen recording, and external sharing.

Expected output

The expected output is a checklist with formatting checks, privacy checks, destination checks, and reviewer sign-off. It should include a decision rule that preserved Markdown is useful only after redaction, because accurate formatting can make sensitive material easier to redistribute if copied carelessly.

Verification checkpoint

Paste only synthetic or already-redacted transcript content into the destination under test. If the generated plan suggests using real secrets to test redaction, copying full raw logs, or sending transcripts to unauthorized systems, reject the plan and replace it with fixture-only validation.

Prompt 24: Cross-platform canary scorecard

Purpose

Use this prompt to consolidate Windows, Linux, and macOS validation into a single canary scorecard. OpenAI’s 0.158 release notes call out fixes for Windows sandbox failures involving Windows 10 paths, stored credentials, and large permission policies; Linux startup with nested writable roots; and macOS system path aliases. A rollout should therefore treat cross-platform validation as evidence-driven release gating, not as an assumption that one operating system result generalizes to all.

Copy-paste prompt

You are assisting an authorized platform engineering team. Scope this work only to systems, repositories, sandboxes, and developer workstations that we own or are explicitly authorized to administer.

Safety contract: Do not ask for, reveal, store, or reproduce credentials, bearer tokens, OAuth client secrets, private keys, personal identifiers, privileged customer data, proprietary source beyond the provided placeholders, or confidential logs. Use placeholders such as <WINDOWS_CANARY>, <LINUX_CANARY>, <MACOS_CANARY>, <SANDBOX_PROFILE>, <MCP_SERVER_PLACEHOLDER>, and <SCORECARD_PATH>. Start with read-only discovery. Apply least privilege, narrow tool and domain allowlists, explicit approval before elevated or destructive actions, backups or Git checkpoints, representative test fixtures, redaction, evidence capture, and rollback. Never bypass authentication, approval prompts, sandboxing, endpoint protection, organizational policy, or third-party terms. A human platform owner must verify recommendations and approve every change.

Task: Build a cross-platform Codex 0.158 canary scorecard for a staged rollout.

Include scoring dimensions for:
1. Version confirmation and Git checkpoint discipline.
2. Windows path compatibility, stored-credential behavior using placeholders only, and large permission-policy handling.
3. Linux nested writable-root startup behavior.
4. macOS system path alias behavior.
5. MCP configuration discovery without exposing secrets.
6. OAuth callback and client metadata checks using placeholders.
7. WebSocket bearer-token configuration review without displaying tokens.
8. Elevated approval behavior.
9. Runtime-only grant boundaries.
10. Command completion and launch-failure event evidence.
11. Transcript copy/paste Markdown preservation and redaction.
12. Rollback readiness and owner sign-off.

Return a scorecard with pass, warn, fail, evidence required, owner, and blocker status for each dimension.

Required inputs

• An anonymized list of canary hosts or workstation classes for Windows, Linux, and macOS.
• <SANDBOX_PROFILE> and approval-policy names used in the canary.
• Non-production MCP server placeholders and configuration-file locations where inspection is authorized.
• Evidence-retention rules, including redaction expectations and storage location.
• Release-blocker thresholds approved by the platform owner.

Expected output

The output should be a release-gating scorecard that prevents a green result on one platform from masking a failure on another. It should mark any credential exposure, missing approval evidence, unexpected sandbox access, failed startup, ambiguous command event, or untested rollback as a blocker unless the human platform owner explicitly accepts the risk in writing.

Verification checkpoint

Before promoting the canary, compare the scorecard against representative user workflows rather than only installation success. A valid canary proves that the release behaves acceptably under your policies, fixtures, operating systems, and rollback requirements; it does not prove universal correctness or eliminate the need for future regression tests.

Prompt 25: Rollback package and final sign-off record

Purpose

Use this prompt to produce the final release-evidence packet for Codex 0.158 rollout, including rollback readiness and accountable human sign-off. OpenAI documents CLI configuration, MCP behavior, approval controls, and the 0.158 release changes, but each organization still needs local proof that its workstations, repositories, sandbox profiles, OAuth configuration, WebSocket protection, approval reviews, transcripts, and support procedures meet its own standards.

Copy-paste prompt

You are assisting an authorized platform engineering team. Scope this work only to systems, repositories, sandboxes, and developer workstations that we own or are explicitly authorized to administer.

Safety contract: Do not ask for, reveal, store, or reproduce credentials, bearer tokens, OAuth client secrets, private keys, personal identifiers, privileged customer data, proprietary source beyond the provided placeholders, or confidential logs. Use placeholders such as <ROLLBACK_VERSION>, <RELEASE_EVIDENCE_PATH>, <OWNER_NAME_OR_ROLE>, <CHANGE_TICKET>, <MCP_CONFIG_PLACEHOLDER>, and <SIGNOFF_RECORD>. Start with read-only discovery. Apply least privilege, narrow tool and domain allowlists, explicit approval before elevated or destructive actions, backups or Git checkpoints, representative test fixtures, redaction, evidence capture, and rollback. Never bypass authentication, approval prompts, sandboxing, endpoint protection, organizational policy, or third-party terms. A human platform owner must verify recommendations and approve every change.

Task: Assemble a rollback and final sign-off package for a Codex 0.158 rollout.

Include:
1. Scope of rollout and excluded systems.
2. Version evidence and release-note delta summary.
3. Git checkpoint or backup evidence.
4. Cross-platform canary scorecard summary.
5. MCP OAuth review summary without secrets.
6. WebSocket bearer-token protection review without tokens.
7. Elevated approval and runtime-only grant test summaries.
8. Command completion, launch-failure, and transcript-copy validation summaries.
9. Known limitations, accepted risks, and unresolved blockers.
10. Rollback procedure, rollback owner, rollback trigger thresholds, and communication plan.
11. Human sign-off section with owner role, date, decision, evidence location, and conditions.
12. Post-rollout monitoring and incident-response handoff.

Required inputs

• <ROLLBACK_VERSION> or the approved fallback state, without inventing availability guarantees.
• <RELEASE_EVIDENCE_PATH> for the redacted evidence package.
• <CHANGE_TICKET> or internal change-record identifier.
• Summary outcomes from prompts 1 through 24, with secrets removed.
• Names or roles of human approvers, using role labels if personal names are not appropriate.

Expected output

The output should be a structured sign-off record that a change advisory board, platform owner, security reviewer, or engineering manager can evaluate. It should separate “approved for limited canary,” “approved for staged rollout,” “blocked pending remediation,” and “rollback initiated” decisions. It should not claim that Codex 0.158 is certified secure; it should state what was tested, what evidence exists, and who accepted the remaining risk.

Verification checkpoint

Do not proceed from canary to wider rollout unless the sign-off record has a named accountable owner, rollback triggers, redacted evidence, and a communication path for affected developers. If rollback cannot be executed quickly enough for the organization’s risk tolerance, the correct decision is to delay rollout rather than rely on optimistic monitoring.

Final operating guidance for using prompts 19–25

Prompts 19–25 address the final rollout mile: elevated approval behavior, runtime-only grants, interrupted approvals, command events, transcript handling, cross-platform canary evidence, and final sign-off. They must be used only after inventory, sandbox, MCP, OAuth, bearer-token, and tool-approval work has produced redacted evidence.

A prompt output is not proof of a secure deployment. Platform owners must validate the actual host, configuration, sandbox boundary, callback, token source, tool allowlist, approval record, and rollback path. Reject recommendations that broaden network access, disable approvals, move secrets into project files, or treat one operating system’s result as proof for another.

Evidence lane	Release requirement	Blocker
Cross-platform sandbox	Separate pass evidence for every supported operating system and path pattern	Unknown effective writable root or protected-path behavior
MCP and OAuth	Exact callback, approved scope, secret-safe storage, and negative login tests	Credential exposure, callback mismatch, or unexplained scope
WebSocket authentication	Authorized connections succeed and unauthorized connections fail closed	Unauthenticated listener or token leakage
Approvals	Elevated and write-capable actions reach the correct human reviewer	Action executes without the expected approval
Rollback	Previous known-good version and configuration are restorable	Rollback untested or evidence incomplete

Release sign-off belongs to accountable humans, not to Codex. Record unresolved risks, owners, expiry dates, and rollback triggers. If a required negative test is missing or inconclusive, delay the rollout rather than converting uncertainty into an implicit approval.

Useful Links

• OpenAI Codex 0.158.0 release notes
• OpenAI Codex CLI documentation
• OpenAI Codex MCP documentation
• OpenAI Codex configuration reference
• OpenAI Codex agent approvals and security
• OpenAI prompt engineering guide
• OpenAI evaluations guide